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PANEL II.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL TRIBUNALS
Introduction
PROFESSOR LUNG-CHU CHEN: Good afternoon, ladies and
gentlemen. My name is Lung-chu Chen. I teach international law,
human rights law, foreign affairs, and constitutional law here.
As the world community commemorates the fiftieth
anniversary of the Nuremberg trials,' international war crimes
tribunals that are established under the auspices of the United Nations
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda are receiving increased
attention.2 It is timely to appraise the impacts of the Nuremberg
trials and the continuing issue of accountability in light of recent
developments.
This morning's panel reflected critical perspectives on the
impact of the Nuremberg trials and on the perspectives of those who
played various roles in those trials. This panel will explore
comparative implications of international and national tribunals in
dealing with the issue of accountability. While international tribunals
are attracting increasing attention, the cumulative experience of
national tribunals must be borne in mind and kept in proper
perspective.
There are some important questions that require attention.
How serious is the question of accountability after Nuremberg? Who
threatens accountability? What are the objectives of the activists

I See, e.g., Nicholas Kotch, Rwanda's Genocide Tribunal Slowly Gets into Gear,
Reuters, Dec. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRE File (noting that in
the same month as the fiftieth anniversary of Nuremberg, proceedings to judge the
Rwandan genocide began).
2 See, e.g., Theodor Meron, International Criminalizationof InternationalAtrocities,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 554 (1995).
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involved? What geographic, temporal, institutional, and other
situational factors exist? What other resources and valuable assets are
available to relevant actors? What are the modalities and patterns of
threats on accountability? What are the long-term effects? What are
the effective strategies in holding offenders accountable? What are
the comparative implications in resorting to international or national
tribunals in applying relevant community prescriptions? What lessons
may be drawn from the cumulative experiences of these tribunals?
What are the policy alternatives in pursuit of the common interest of
human kind?
What are the difficulties involved with the
establishment of the permanent international criminal court? What
are the prospects for such a court?
We are fortunate to have a group of distinguished speakers to
address many of these questions. There is a minor change of the
cast, though. Mr. Neil Kritz will speak at this panel and Professor
Cherif Bassiouni will speak at the next panel because he has to testify
before Congress today.
Professor Jordan Paust
PROFESSOR CHEN: Professor Jordan Paust will start by providing
us with an international overview of accountability after Nuremberg
in terms of crimes against humanity, 3 leader responsibility, and
national fora.4
Jordan Paust is Professor of Law at the University of Houston
Law Center. He was on the faculty of the Judge Advocate General
School during the Vietnam War. He was on the first team of lawyers
representing Bosnia-Herzegovina before the International Court of

I The International Military Tribunal (IMT) defined crimes against humanity as crimes
including "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecution on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal." The Charter of the International Military
Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. See generally
Meron, supra note 2, at 556-59 (1995) (discussing crimes against humanity within the
Rwandan and Yugoslavian statutes and the differences therein).
4 Professor Paust presented a paper, Threats to Accountability after Nuremberg: Crimes
Against Humanity, Leader Responsibility and National Fora, printed here in its entirety.
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Justice. He is a past Chairman of the Section on International Law
of the Association of American Law Schools, a past Chairman of the
American Bar Association Committee on International Law and the
Use of Force, and was a member of the Executive Committee and
Executive Council of the American Society of International Law. He
is a prolific scholar who has written extensively in the field of
international law, human rights, humanitarian law, and the use of
He co-authored a book entitled War Crimes
military force.
Jurisdictionand Due Process: A Case Study of Bangladesh. He is
currently preparing a case book on international criminal law in
collaboration with Professor Bassiouni and others. It is a pleasure to
present to you Professor Paust.
PROFESSOR JORDAN PAUST: Thank you Lung-chu Chen. It is
indeed a pleasure to be here at your law school. Lung-chu Chen is
an old friend of mine; a young friend of a long time, I should say.

THREATS TO ACCOUNTABILITY
AFTER NUREMBERG: CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY, LEADER RESPONSIBILITY
AND NATIONAL FORA
Introduction
Accountability after Nuremberg is sometimes seriously
threatened. The prohibition of crimes against humanity is in danger
of being whittled away by newly invented and restrictive definitions,
textwriter rhetoric or preferences, and far too limited applications by
tribunals. At times, the disfigurement of responsibility may be
unintended, but it seems that certain threats are calculated by those
who seek direct or indirect immunities for international crime. Those
who wish to retain the customary prohibition of crimes against
humanity should be vigilant against indirect immunities sought in
limiting definitions and restrictive tests of responsibility. As this
essay discloses, they occur too frequently and the attack on
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accountability is real.

I. Crimes Against Humanity
A. Historic Underpinnings
In 1945, Justice Robert Jackson's Report to the President of
the United States, while addressing crimes against humanity, noted
that "atrocities and persecutions on racial or religious grounds" were
already outlawed under general principles of domestic law of civilized
states and that "[tihese principles have been assimilated as a part of
International Law at least since 1907. "1 Jackson found support for
the latter part of his statement in the de Martens clause of the 1907
Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land' which affirmed the existence of "principles of the law of
nations" resulting "from the laws of humanity." 6
Prior to 1945, there had been other recognitions of crimes
against humanity or crimen contra omnes. In 1915, the governments
of Great Britain, France, and Russia had condemned massacres of
Armenians by Turks as "crimes against humanity and civilization." 7
In the 1919 Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the
Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties8 formulated by
representatives from several States 9 and presented to the Paris Peace
Conference, criminal responsibility was identified in terms such as
"offences against . . . the laws of humanity" and "violations,"

4 Report of Justice Robert H. Jackson to the President of the United States, released
June 7, 1945, reprinted in Dep't State Bull. 1071, 1076 (June 10, 1945).
5 Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No.
539.

Id. preamble. It was named for George Frederick de Martens. See U.S. Dep't of
Army Pam. No. 27-161-2, 2 International Law 15 & n.54 (1962).
6

7 See R. WRIGHT, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION
35

(148); Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178, 181
(1946).
8 Reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1920).
9 The States were: United States, British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium,
Greece, Poland, Roumania, and Serbia.
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"breach[es] of," and "outrages against.

. .

the laws of humanity."" °

In 1874, George Curtis labeled slavery a "crime against humanity, ""
and in 1921 the U.S. Secretary of State wrote that the slave trade had
12 Related phrases such as
become a "crime against humanity.,
"crimes against mankind,"1 3 "crimes against the human family,"14
and "duties of humanity"I5 appear far earlier in human history; while
the relationship has not always been recognized, textwriters have
noted that "[t]he Nuremberg Charter applied a customary
international law of human rights in charging the Nazi war criminals,
inter alia, with 'crimes against humanity." 16
1o See M. Cherif Bassiounoi, CRIMES

AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

169-70, 555-57 (1992). However, representatives from the United States and Japan
dissented from use of the concept of offenses against humanity. See Bassiouni, supra
at 172-73.
1 See 3 ORATIONS AND ADDRESSES OF GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS 208 (C. Norton ed.
1894).
12 Robert Lansing, Notes on World Sovereignty, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 13, 25 (1921).
3 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 513 (1821) (Wirt, Att'y Gen.) (citing Grotius); E. DE VATTEL,
LAW OF NATIONS 464-65 (1758) (J. Chitty ed. 1883) (private or public violence against
foreign ambassador is an "offence against the law of nations" and a "crime against
mankind").
14 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 515 (1821) (the list includes: piracy, poisoners, assassins, and
incendiaries by profession). See also Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.)
111, 116 (Pa. 1784) (private assault on foreign consul is a "crime against the whole
world"); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 306 (1865) (quoting Patrick Henry in his discussion
of banditti as "an enemy to the human name"); Willard B. Cowles, Universality of
Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REV. 177, 188-90 (1945) (quoting Ayala's
statement that brigands are the "common enemy of all" and Gentili's statement that
brigands had "broken the treaty of the human race"). In a unanimous resolution by 21
American States at the 1928 Pan-American Conference in Havana, it was declared that
a "war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species."
Quoted in the Judgment and Opinion of the IMT at Nuremberg, reprinted in 41 AM. J.
INT'L L. 172, 220 (1947).
'1 Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1107 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) ("duties of humanity" are
obligatory for "states as well as individuals"). The crime addressed was a private breach
of neutrality in violation of the law of nations and treaties. Id. See also DE VATTEL
supra note 13. On July 6, 1775, the American colonies formally opposed British
political oppression partly on the basis of "principles of humanity." 1775 Declaration
of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms.
16 Louis HENKIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 986 (2d ed. 1987); see also JOHN
H.
CAREY, UN PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 61-64 (1971);
LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 35-38, 61-62 (1968);
RICHARD B. LILLICH. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 896-99 (2d ed. 1991); MYRES
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What is interesting with respect to historic recognitions of
"laws of humanity" and "crimes against humanity" is that the reach
of these precepts was potentially quite broad, perhaps as far-reaching
as human rights. They involved several types of conduct and were

M. MCDOUGAL, ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 354-56, 535-36,
542-46 (1980); FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 663-64, 715-17 (1990); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, in 3
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT 51, 52 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
1987); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The ProscribingFunction of InternationalCriminalLaw in
the Processes of International Protection of Human Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB.
ORD. 193, 201 (1982); Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Right
Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10
MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 547 & n.11, 564, 566 & n.156, 568 & n.167, 575 & n.213, 578
(1989) (several uses of the phrase violations of the "rights of humanity" in the early and
mid-1800's, including use by the U.S. Supreme Court in The Julia, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
181, 193 (1814)); Lawrence C. Petrowski, Law and the Conduct of the Vietnam War,
in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 439, 467-69, 475 (R. Falk ed.,
1969). On criminal sanctions for human rights violations see, for example, Jordan J.
Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV.
H.R.J. 51, 56-59 (1992) [hereinafter Private Duties].
On other historic uses of arguably related phrases or precepts or general
historic background, see, for example, United States v. Altstoetter ("The Justice Case"),
III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 3, 954,
981-82 (1950-51) (quoting Jacob Bluntschli concerning interrelated "human rights,"
which were so termed in Telford Taylor's FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No.

10 226 (1949)); United States v. Ohlendorf ("The Einsatzgruppen Case"), IV

TRIALS

OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 3, 411, 497-98

(1950-51); Matter of Barbie, 78 INT'L L. REP. 125, 141-42 (1988) (submission of the
French Advocate General); Hans Kelsen, Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial
Constitute a Precedent in International Law?, 1 INT'L L.Q. 153, 164-65 (1947);
Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 147-48, 152, 165-73; GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 2
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 23-27, 462-66 (1968) (addressing
the international trial of Burgundian Peter von Hagenbach at Breisach in 1474 for the
oppression of persons in territory under his charge and actions against the "laws of God
and man"-a trial ordered by the Archduke of Austria and presided over by 28 judges
from allied towns); Telford Taylor, supra at 81-82 (re: von Hagenbach), 186; Leila Sadat
Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of
Cassation:From Touvier to Barbie andBack Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 289, 29698 (1994); cf. Telford Taylor, remarks, 80 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 71 (1986). But
see Bassiouni, remarks, id. at 62; Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, supra at 52-54,
61.
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not limited to state actors or war contexts. 17
B. World War II Definitions
During the World War II era, several definitions of crimes
against humanity were formally documented. Each of these contained
basically two types of crimes against humanity. One primarily
addressed certain inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population and the other addressed persecutions on political, racial,
or religious grounds. During the subsequent Nuremberg proceedings
under Control Council Law No. 10, it was also recognized that
genocide is a crime under international law and is "the prime
illustration of a crime against humanity."' 8
Both the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg and Control Council Law No. 10 recognized two types
of crimes against humanity. In each, the phrase "against any civilian
population" appears only with respect to the first and not with respect
to prohibited persecutions." 9

The Principles of the Nuremberg

11See The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Dusko Tadic, International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, paras. 78-81 (Aug. 10, 1995) (crimes against humanity can
occur in times of relative peace) (available on the World Wide Web at
http://www.igc.apc.org/tribunal) (affirmed by the Appeals Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995). But
see Wexler, supra note 13, at 296 ("Evolving from . . . peculiar ideas about the laws
of war. . . ."), and 326 n. 167.
18 United States v. Altstoetter ("The Justice Case"), supra note 13, at 983, (quoting
U.N. G.A. Res. 96(1) (Dec. 11, 1946), 1 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1, at 18889 (1947) (covering political groups as well)); see also Attorney General of Israel v.
Eichmann (Supreme Court of Israel) (1962), reprinted in 36 INT'L L. REP. 277 (1968)
(recognizing two types as well); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582-83 (6th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); U.N. G.A. Res. 2391, 23 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 18, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
19 See CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT NUREMBERG, art. 6
(c) (1945); Control Council Law No. 10, art. II (1)(c) (1945). In 1946, the U.N.
General Assembly affirmed "the principles of international law recognized by the
Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal." G.A. Res. 95()
(Dec. 11, at 1946), 1 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/236, at 1144 (1946). Article 6(c) of
the Nuremberg Charter reads:
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or
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Charter and Judgment adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in
1950 retained this same distinction; 20 further, both the 1948 Report
of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Report of the
International Law Commission that formulated the Principles of the
Nuremberg Charter and Judgment recognized that there were
basically two types of crimes against humanity addressed during the
prosecutions in Europe.2 ' With respect to prosecutions by the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the Tokyo Charter
not only recognized these two general types, but also did not require

not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
Article II(1)(c) of Control Council Law No. 10 reads:
Crimes againstHumanity. Atrocities and offenses, including but not
limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of
the country where perpetrated.
The word "or" set off by a comma demonstrates the existence of two basic types. See
also Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, supra note 15 ("on the one hand, and
persecution . . . on the other"); Matter of Barbie, supra note 13, at 143 (French
...);
Advocate General: "the conjunction 'or' . . . implies two distinct categories.
TELFORD TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 79 ("including 'persecutions ... "'); Petrowski,
supra note 13, at 467; Wexler, supra note 13, at 309 ("two categories"), 359 ("the
persecution-type crimes . . . are separate"); supra note 15; infra notes 17-19. Count
Four of the Indictment before the IMT at Nuremberg also separated the two types of
crimes against humanity. Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni has generally retained these
definitions in his draft code. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW-A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE 75 (1980); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 141 (1987). See also Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, supra
note 13, at 56 n.41 ("second category"), 57.
20 See 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 12, at 11-14 (A/1316), principle VI c:
Crimes against humanity: Murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian
population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds,
when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in
execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any
war crime.
21
See Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 38 (U.N. W.C.C. Report), 40 (I.L.C Report at para.
120).
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that either type be committed "against any civilian population.""2
C. Recent Attempts To Restrict Definitions
Despite the broad historic reach of the concept of crimes
against humanity and well-documented definitions in the World War
II era, there have been certain recent definitions that might needlessly
restrict coverage and accountability. One such definition appears in
Article 5 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia.23 Unlike all of the definitions in the international
instruments arising from the World War II era, Article 5 of the
Statute fuses the two types together as one, listing "persecutions on
political, racial and religious grounds" as merely one form of
inhumane acts and requiring that all categories of crimes against
humanity be "directed against any civilian population. "24 Article 5
of the Statute also changes the Nuremberg phrase "committed
against" (which, in the 1950 I.L.C Principles, reads "done against")
to "directed against," a phrase that may require a slightly higher
threshold of mens rea; and it adds three relevant methods or acts
("imprisonment," "torture," and "rape"), although each is most
likely covered by the Nuremberg phrase "other inhumane acts" and
each appeared in Control Council Law No. 10. This definitional
orientation was adopted despite the fact that the U.N. SecretaryGeneral's Report adopting such a focus had noted that such crimes
22 See id. at 34 (Art. 5(c) of the Tokyo Charter). T.I.A.S. No. 1589. Article 5(c) reads

in part:
Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on
political or racial grounds in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
23 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. S.C. Doc. S/25704, para. 49 (1993), reprintedin United
Nations:Secretary-General'sReporton Aspects ofEstablishingan InternationalTribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
HumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M.
1159, at 1173-74 (1993), adopted by U.N. S.C. Res. 827 (1993), reprinted in id. at
1203.
24 Id. at para. 49, art. 5.
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were recognized in the Nuremberg Charter and Control Council Law
No. 1025 and that the law "which has beyond doubt become part of
international customary law . . . is embodied in" the Nuremberg

Charter and the Genocide Convention.26
Presumably, customary definitions contained in those
instruments will guide the Tribunal, since they are recognizably those
accepted under customary international law and such law was stated
to be the law that the Tribunal is required to apply in order to avoid
problems connected with "the principle nullum crimen sine lege" or
sine jus.27 With this admonition in mind, it is possible for the
Tribunal to consider that the customary definitions, without extra
limitations not found in customary international law, have been
incorporated by reference when Article 5 refers to "crimes against
humanity. "2,z When the article adds that the Tribunal "shall have the
power to prosecute" when acts are "directed against any civilian
population," it may be that such language was not meant to be
exclusive or to demonstrate when the Tribunal "shall only" have
power to prosecute crimes against humanity. Certainly customary
international law was meant to be the guiding force, a necessary
background, the only delimiting criterion, and what the Tribunal is
required to apply.
If so, it should not be possible for an accused to escape
accountability for criminal persecutions on the ground that they were
not "directed against" a "civilian population" as such or in any other
way. First, neither the persecution type of crimes against humanity,
nor genocide under customary international law have such a limiting
phrase. Second, as the U.N. War Crimes Commission reported in

Id. at para. 47, art. 4.
Id. at para. 35, art. 1.
27 Id. at para. 34, art. 1. Concerning the point that lege here is not lex butjus or law
26

that includes customary law, see, for example, United States v. Ohlendorf, supra note
13, at 458, passim.
28 See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1942) (discussing incorporation by
reference) (cited approvingly in the Judgment and Opinion of the I.M.T. at Nuremberg,
reprinted in 41 AM. J.INT'L L. at 220); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
153, 158-61 (1820); Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdictionover ExtraterritorialActs of
Terrorismand Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of InternationalLaw Under the FSIA
and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 216 (1983); see also Attorney
General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 INT'L L. REP. 277.
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1948, even when such a phrase is applicable (i.e., to the first type),
the words "appear to indicate ...[acts] against civilians" as opposed

to a population as such, the Commission also speculating "that single
or isolated acts against individuals may be considered to fall outside"
the phrase.2 9 Thus, it is the commission of an act against (i.e.,
"committed against" or "done against") civilians that is covered and
not merely the intentional targeting of civilians as such (i.e.,
"directed against"). Even the slightly higher mens rea threshold is
met, however, when civilians are targeted. With respect to single
acts, it is arguable that commission of one act injuring one victim fits
the definition if there is an intent thereby to act against or to target
other civilians (e.g., as in the case of a terroristic murder or
inhumane act against an instrumental target with the object of
producing intense fear or anxiety in a primary target involving other
civilians).3 The same double, or terroristic-type targeting may also
exist with respect to certain persecutions. Moreover, merely because
the word persecutions is in the plural does not answer the question
whether one persecution is sufficient because the definitions also refer
to crimes in the plural (i.e., crimes against humanity, and thus
"persecutions" constitute "crimes").
It should be noted that the Report of the U.N. SecretaryGeneral stated that crimes against humanity are "inhumane" and

29 See Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 571, (reproducing an excerpt from the 1948 Report

of the U.N. W.C.C.); see also Wexler, supra note 13, at 359.
" See also Lyal S. Sunga, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 136 (1992) (an attack on one person can suffice);
Wexler, supra note 13, at 359 (French approach covered case where the perpetrator had
"both an intent to hurt the victim and an intent to attack the group to which the victim
belongs"); Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, supra note 15, at 278 (as few as 93
people sufficed in one circumstance). Moreover, in Matterof Barbie, sometimes as few
as 3, 7, 11, 30, or 44 victims comprised the number of persons covered. See Matter of
Barbie, supra note 13, at 138, 148 (addressing a later decision of the Supreme Court in
1986, the editors stated that the Court held that acts against a woman, her husband, and
son "could all constitute crimes against humanity"). Barbie was convicted, on 340
counts, of 17 crimes against humanity. Id. at 148. In the Touvier case, the defendant
was convicted of being an accomplice to crimes against humanity involving merely the
death of seven persons. See Wexler, supra note 13, at 292-93 & n.3, 379. Clearly the
number of victims need not be large or the crime "widespread." But see Oren Gross,
The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 16 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 783, 790 n.21 (1995).
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"very serious," 3 but such labels do not appear in Article 5 of the
Statute of the International Tribunal, nor are they general elements of
the offense or limiting criteria for all types of crimes against
humanity. Thus, the Tribunal need not entertain defense claims that
some acts were not really "inhumane" or "very serious".
Similarly, the Report noted that some such crimes were part
of a "widespread" or "systematic" attack,32 but these words were not
considered to be required elements of the crime that prosecutors must
prove and they do not appear in Article 5 of the Statute. Clearly
also, the words "serious," "widespread," and "systematic" appear in
none of the Charters or formulations noted above, nor do they exist
in the definition of genocide contained in the Genocide Convention
which, as noted, is a special form of crimen contra omnes. Such
phrases sometimes appear in judicial opinions33 or works of
textwriters in connection with particular cases or as occasional
rhetorical flourish. They are at times descriptive of actual events or
partly poetic, but such expressions should not be confused with
required elements of the general crime under customary international
law. To stress the point, it should not be a defense that an
individual's acts were not "systematic" or "widespread." These are
not defenses to genocide, slavery, or more general human rights
violations, nor do they appear as elements or defenses in the
customary international instruments.
Most unfortunately, however, the newer Rwandan Statute has
adopted a restrictive approach that will not serve accountability.
3 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council

Resolution 808, supra note 20, at para. 48.
2 See id. (listing "such as" examples as opposed to required elements).
33But see United States v. Altstoetter, supra note 13, at 973, 982 (construing "against
any civilian population" as requiring systematic conduct, government involvement, and
"not isolated" cases); United States v. Ohlendorf, supra note 13, at 49 ("acts committed
in the course of wholesale and systematic violation of life and liberty"). These were
cases under Control Council Law No. 10. The IMT did not state that such were
requirements, nor did the Tokyo Tribunal.
The Indictment before the IMT at
Nuremberg also addressed a "common plan or conspiracy ...[which] came to embrace
as typical and systematic means . . Crimes against Humanity" and a "common
plan . . . to commit Crimes against Humanity." 1Nazi Conspiracy andAggression 14,
15, 54 (1946) (IMT Indictment No. 1 of Oct. 6, 1945). Thus, there is a difference
between the additional circumstances noted (i.e., a "common plan" and "systematic")
and elements of the crime or crimes as such.
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Article 3 of the Rwandan Statute also fuses the two basic types and
addresses merely those acts that are "part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population .

. "3 Why this

. .

far more limited form of crimes against humanity was utilized is not
explained. In any event, it should not be repeated in a more
permanent code or statute. Thus, I disagree with certain statements
in the 1994 Report of the International Law Commission. While
arguing for a similar fusion of the two types recognized at
Nuremberg and a severely restrictive definition, the ILC Report
stated:
It is the understanding of the Commission that
the definition of crimes against humanity encompasses
inhumane acts of a very serious character involving
widespread or systematic violations aimed at the
civilian population in whole or part. The hallmarks
of such crimes lie in their large-scale and systematic
nature. The particular forms of unlawful act (murder,
enslavement, deportation, torture, rape, imprisonment
etc.) are less crucial to the definition [than] the factors
of scale and deliberate policy, as well as in their
being targeted against the civilian population in whole
or in part. This idea is sought to be reflected in the
phrase "directed against any civilian population" in
article 5 of the Yugoslav Tribunal Statute. .

.

. The

term "directed against any civilian population" should
be taken to refer to acts committed as part of a
widespread and systematic attack against a civilian
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or
religious grounds. The particular acts referred to in
the definition are acts deliberately committed as part
of such an attack.35

U.N. S.C. Res. 955, Annex, art. 3 (8 Nov. 1994), U.N. Doc. 5/RES/955 (1994),
reprinted in United Nations: Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) Establishing the
International Tribunalfor Rwanda, 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1600, 1603 (1994).
35 Report of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the work of its forty-sixth
session, 2 May-22 July 1994, 49 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 10 (A/49/10), at 76, para.
14. This is a change from the customary ILC definition. See supra notes 17-18.
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If adopted, such a codification would fail humanity. Political
persecution, religious persecution, and racial persecution should not
be less significant than nearly all other international crimes, and the
I.L.C. should not create new thresholds of accountability that are not
only missing from customary law reflected in the Charter of the IMT
at Nuremberg, but are also not found in connection with the vast
majority of international crimes.36
Some may argue that it is not practical to convince state elites
that they should retain a Nuremberg-oriented prohibition of political
or religious persecution, but such a parading of the word "practical,"
in Orwellian garb, would merely serve political and religious
oppression. Surely such a word has lost any redeeming value for the
victims of politicide. 37 For them, the word "practical" smacks of an
elite or self-oriented view that is partly unreal, socially dangerous,
and simply outrageous!
Another potentially restrictive definition of crimes against
humanity appears in the Canadian Criminal Code. It fuses the two
types recognized at Nuremberg into one, requiring that the act or
omission be "committed against any civilian population or any
identifiable group of persons." 38 Clearly, such a requirement does
not comply with customary definitions, since not all types must be
committed against a civilian population or group of persons. It
appears then that accountability after Nuremberg and uniform
application of international criminal law is endangered by imperfect
national legislation.

I For example, there is no requirement that genocide, piracy, slavery and related
practices, breaches of neutrality, mercenarism, war crimes, aircraft hijacking,
boatjacking, aircraft sabotage, terrorism, attacks on internationally protected persons,
drug offenses, counterfeiting of foreign currency, or torture be widespread and
systematic See generally JORDAN J. PAUST, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS (forthcoming 1996).
31 Politicide has been defined as: "a crime against world peace-[consisting] of the
planning, preparation, initaiation, or waging of a war of aggression; or a war in violation
of international treaties, agreements or assurances; or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the aforementioned." Luis Kutner,
Politicide: The Necessity of an International Court of CriminalJustice, 2 DEN. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 185, 185 (1972). See generally id.; Jordan J. Paust, Aggression Against
Authority: The Crime of Oppression, PoliticideAnd Other Crimes Against Human Rights,
18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 283 (1986) (containing draft Convention).
38 See CAN. CRIM. CODE § 7(3.76).
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The problem is exacerbated by loose rhetoric found in
national judicial opinions. While addressing the Canadian law in
1994, Justice Cory of the Supreme Court of Canada seemed
particularly fond of adding phrases or descriptions that should not be
considered mistakenly as elements of the general crime. Among the
phrases used by Justice Cory that are clearly absent from the
customary international instruments and that do not reflect elements
or limitations under international law are the following: "so grave
that they would shock the conscience of all right thinking people," 39
40
"cruel and terrible actions which are the essential elements,"
"grievous," 41 "stigma . . .must . . .[be] overwhelming ...[and
have] particularly heavy public opprobrium, 42 "high degree of moral
outrage, "4 "untold misery," 4 "cruel suffering," 4" "barbarous
cruelty,"46 "requisite added dimension of cruelty and barbarism,""
and the "element of inhumanity must be demonstrated. 48 Though
critical of some of these phrases, dissenting Justice La Forest stated
that such crimes "obviously involve moral culpability" and the
conduct before him "strikes one as morally vile and inexcusable. 49
It is through such limiting efforts that victims are betrayed. Unless
Canada changes its legislation or such severely limiting interpretations
of its law, Canada will remain unable to fulfill its obligations under
international law to enact appropriate legislation 0 and to initiate

9 Her Majesty the Queen v. Imre Finta, 28 C.R. (4th) 265 (Sup. Ct. Canada 1994)
(Cory., J., opinion) (manuscript opinion at 32). But see id. (La Forest, J., dissenting)
(manuscript opinion at 40 & 60).
- Finta, 28 C.R. (4th) 265 (manuscript opinion at 34).
41 Id. (manuscript opinion at 35).
42 Id. (manuscript opinion at 35-36).
1 Id. (manuscript opinion at 36).
' Id. (manuscript opinion at 37).
41 Id. (manuscript opinion at 38).
1 Id. (manuscript opinion at 39).
47 Id.
I Id. (La Forest, J., dissenting) (manuscript opnion at 42).
ld. (La Forest, J., dissenting).
I9
o The duty to enact appropriate legislation is recognizably customary. See, e.g., G.A.
Res. 3074, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); U.S. Dep't of
Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare 181, para. 506(b) (1956); RESTATEMENT
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702, cmt. d (3d ed. 1987)
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prosecution of those reasonably accused of relevant international
crimes if it does not extradite. 5
The French Court of Cassation was potentially no less
misleading in the case of Klaus Barbie in 1985 when stating that
"inhumane acts and persecution committed in a systematic manner in
the name of a State practising a policy of ideological supremacy"
constitute crimes against humanity2 In context, the Court may not
have sought to limit accepted definitions but to highlight the point that
the stated acts will fit within the definition of the general crime.

("A state violates customary law if it . . . fails to make genocide a crime . . . ."). It
is also expressed in Article V of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; and with respect to sometimes-related crimes
in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1955); see also id., art. 1 (States must respect and ensure respect for
the Conventions in all circumstances). Since human rights lie at the base of crimes
against humanity, see supra note 13, and duties to prevent, arrest, and prosecute or
extradite are related to obligations under the U.N. Charter (e.g., G.A. Res. 2840, 26
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 29, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 3074, 28 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973)), universal duties of States under
Articles 550 and 56 of the Charter to respect and observe human rights are also
implicated.
5' Concerning such a duty see, for example, BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL
CODE, supra note 16, at 53; Jordan J. Paust, Universality and the Responsibility to
Enforce InternationalCriminalLaw:No U.S. Sanctuaryfor Alleged Nazi War Criminals,
11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 337, 337-40 (1989); U.S. Dep't of Army, FM 27-10, supra note
47. Canada could reinterpret its legislation far more consistently with international law.
Such would be consistent with its major purpose and legislative history documented in
Justice La Forest's opinion, supranote 36, ("to adopt all appropriatemeasuresnecessary
to ensure that any war criminals .... "(emphasis added)); see also id. at (manuscript
opinion at 9). (Nuremberg principle "was adopted in the Canadian legislation" section
7 (3.74)), and (manuscript opinion at 14). Such a legislative purpose and form of
incorporation of international legal standards is certainly also consistent with Section 11
of the Canadian Charter (i.e., must constitute "an offence under . . . international
law . . . ."). Moreover, Section 25(1) and (3) of the legislative scheme can and should
be interpreted with reference to international standards, especially with respect to phrases
such as "the law" and "on reasonable grounds."
11 Matter of Barbie, France, Court of Cassation (Chambre d'Accusation), decision of
Dec. 20, 1985, 78 INT'L L. REP. 125, 137 (1988). On the actual numbers of victims,
see supra note 27. For a different translation, see Wexler, supra note 13, at 342. A
lower appellate court had provided an incorrect definition: "Only the persecution of
persons who are non-combatants, committed in furtherance of a deliberate State
policy ......
See id. at 139 (quoting the Chambre d'Accusation).
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Under international law, it is evident that crimes against humanity,
including genocide and slavery, simply do not need to be systematic
or part of State policy.53 They can be sporadic or unorganized and
engaged in by private perpetrators.
Addressing subsequent trends in France, Professor Wexler
states that "[w]hen articulated by the Court of Cassation in the Barbie
case, it was unclear what the judges were driving at with this
language, which cannot, of course, be found anywhere in Article 6(c)
or elsewhere in the IMT Charter or judgment." 54 In an apt and
highly critical summary of developments, including the more recent
Touvier cases, she adds:
Unfortunately, however, the language of this
decision later came to stand for several propositions:
first, that the perpetrator must have as his mental
intent both an intent to hurt the victim and an intent
to attack the group to which the victim belongs (as
evidenced by the attack of the victim); second, that
only if the perpetrator (i) carried out his crimes on
behalf of a State and (ii) that State was one practicing
a hegemonic political ideology, could the perpetrator's
act or acts be characterized as crimes against
humanity. Both propositions are foreign to Article
6(c) and are arguably erroneous.

5 See supra notes 16-19, 27; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, supra note 47, arts. II and IV; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d. 232,
239-43 (2d Cir. 1995); Paust, Private Duties, supra note 13, at 56-59; Wexler, supra
note 13, at 360; but see Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 800 (9th Cir. 1986)
(erroneous dicta); BASSIOUNI, supra note 7, at 245, 248-50, 255-56; Christian
Tomuschat, Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind and the Recalcitrant
Third State, 24 ISRAEL Y.B. H.R. 41, 49 (1955). Also, most international crimes can
be committed by private perpetrators.
I" Wexler, supra note 13, at 359.
11 Id. Elsewhere, she stated that the errors were more than arguable. See, e.g., id. at
343-44 (noting that elements of state hegemonic political ideology and common plan
were incorrect), 355 ("The most egregious error, by far, however, was the introduction
of the requirements of 'hegemonic state' and 'execution of a common plan' to the long
list of elements of the crime against humanity. Neither was justified as a matter of
statutory interpretation . . . and both appear to be blatant attempts to exonerate ..
360, 363.
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Such erroneous limitations of accountability, she notes, were
extended in 1988 when the Court, "[iln its final word in the Barbie
case," added a requirement (also erroneous) "that the defendant must
intend to further a 'common plan' of a state practicing a hegemonic
political ideology." 5 6 Finally, the French legislature passed a 1992
law containing an improper definition of genocide" and its own
severely limiting definition of crimes against humanity-ominously
deleting "persecution" as such, requiring a common plan and acts
organized in carrying it out, and requiring acts "against a civil
population group.""8
More than misleading and quite in error has been the severely
limiting definition of genocide in United States legislation. 9 The
United States definition nearly guarantees that acts of genocide will
It is so fundamentally
not be prosecuted in the United States.'
inconsistent with international law and the Genocide Convention that
it is clear the United States is not complying with its treaty
obligations. 6 ' It demonstrates as well that national legislative efforts
can be quite disingenuous and dangerous.

I

Id. at 361. See also id. at 344. Professor Wexler rightly notes that it is particularly
inappropriate to add an element of "common plan" to the general crime when it not only
did not appear in Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter, but it also constitutes a separate
offense involving a "common plan or conspiracy." Wexler, supra note 13, at 361; see
also supra note 30. The same pertains with respect to genocide. Compare Articles II
and 111(a) with Article Ill(b) of the Genocide Convention, supra note 47. Thus, the
French legislation concerning genocide is also in error. See infra note 54.
11 See id. at 367 n.343, 379 Annex IV (trans. of 1992 Art. 211-1, the legislation
erroneously adding: "in carrying out a common plan"). Under the French Constitution,
treaties are superior to domestic legislation. See, e.g., Matter of Barbie, supra note 13,
at 131 (French appellate decision of Oct. 6, 1983, addressing the London Agreement,
containing the Charter of the IMT at Nuremberg, and the supremacy of treaties under
Article 55 of the Constitution). Thus, for example, the Genocide Convention should
prevail over conflicting and more limiting aspects of domestic legislation.
11 See id. at 366-67, 380 (trans. of 1992 Art. 212-1, erroneously adding: "and organized
in carrying out a common plan against a civil population group"). Yet it deleted any
reference to a state or hegemonic political ideology.
59 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (1994).
60 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091(a), 1019(d), 1093(8) 1994; Jordan J.Paust, Congress
and Genocide: They're Not Going To Get Away With It, 11 MICH. J.INT'L L. 90, 94-99
(1989); infra note 83.
61 Paust, supra note 57, at 98-100, 104. Concerning U.S. obligations, see also supra
notes 47-48.
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In contrast, the 1973 Bangladesh International Crimes
(Tribunals) Act provides definitions of crimes against humanity and
genocide that generally reflect customary international law.62 In
particular, the 1973 definition of crimes against humanity retained the
two basic types and generally retained the language from the World
War II era. Not particularly inappropriate was the Australian War
Crimes Amendment Act of 1988.63 Although it used a limiting
phrase "serious crime, "I it contained two separate categorizations of
crime relating to (1) "persecution," and (2) "intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as
such." 6I Another section also incorporated crimes against humanity
"under international law" as a limit to any defenses. 66
II. Recent Attempts to Restrict Leader Responsibility
In addition to criminal responsibility as a principal,
conspirator, or complicitor, leaders can be charged with dereliction
of duty or criminal negligence. 67 The widely-known customary
I

Article 3(2)(a) and (c), reprintedin JORDAN J. PAUST & ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN, WAR
(1974).
Under § 3(a) of the Act, however, the legislation is not extraterritorial.
, reprinted in part in J.
6 War Crimes Amendment Act 1988, 1989 Austl. Acts _
Martin Wagner, Note, U.S. Prosecution of Past and Future War Criminals and
Criminals Against Humanity: Proposals for Reform Based on the Canadian and
Australian Experience, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 887, 922-24 (1989). The 1989 legislation is
otherwise severely limited. It applies only to crimes committed during World War II.
See § 5, reprinted in Wagner, supra at pincite; Wagner, supra at 922, 926; see also
Graham T. Blewitt, The Necessity for Enforcement of InternationalHumanitarianLaw,
89 Proc. Amer. Soc. of Int'l L. 298, 299 (1995) (concerning prosecutorial efforts in
Australia).
, reprinted in
I War Crimes Amendment Act 1988, § 6(1), 1989 Austl. Act _
Wagner, supra note 60, at 922.
Id. § 7(3), reprinted in Wagner, supra note 60, at 923.
Id. § 17, reprinted in Wagner, supra note 60, at 924 n.188.
67 See, e.g., extract of Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(1 Nov. 1948), in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 13, at 141-42 ("fail,"
"neglects," "fault," "negligence or supineness"); id. at 163 (Roling, J., dissenting)
("criminal negligence"); United States v. von Leeb, 10 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1; id. vol. 11, at 543-44 (1948)
("dereliction" and "criminal negligence"); United States v. List, id. vol. 11, at 1256,
CRIMES JURISDICTION AND DUE PROCESS: A CASE STUDY OF BANGLADESH 55
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standard with respect to criminal negligence has been termed the
"knew or should have known" standard whereby a leader is
criminally responsible: (1) if he or she had knowledge or should have
had knowledge of illegality that had occurred, was occurring, or was
about to occur at the hands of subordinates, (2) he or she had an
opportunity to act, and (3) such a person failed to take reasonable
corrective action under the circumstances.6" Whether a person should

1271 ("is charged with notice . . . dereliction of duty ...[and] cannot plead his own
dereliction as a defense"); III Manual of Military Law, The Law of War on Land 178
(British War Office 1958) ("negligently or deliberately"); U.S. Dep't of Army, FM 2710, supra note 47, at 178-79, para. 501; U.S. Dep't of Army Pam. No. 27-161-2, II
INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 (1961) (quoting In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 16 (1946)
("neglect to take reasonable measures ... an affirmative duty to take such measures as
were within his power and appropriate in the circumstances ...."));
id. at 222 (postWorld War I Leipzig trial of Major Crusius: "Guilty through negligence"); U.S. Army
Subiect Schedule 27-1, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Convention No. IV
of 1907, 10, 15-17 (1970); Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 20, at para. 56
("imputed responsibility or criminal negligence"); Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam:
Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99, 175-83 (1972), and
numerous references therein (cited in United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1183
(1973)).
Dereliction of duty or criminal negligence standards allow prosecution under
thresholds far less than actual knowledge, wilfulness, or recklessness. Thus, standards
such as "wilfully blind," "deliberately," "knowingly took the serious risk," or
"recklessly" pose too high a threshold concerning leader responsibility. Additionally,
leader responsibility is a separate offense, independent of the mens rea element of the
offense committed by the primary perpetrator. For example, a primary perpetrator
might commit the crime of murder of a detainee which involves the intentional killing
of a detainee, and yet the superior can be responsible under the "should have known"
test (for a separate offense of dereliction of duty and one with a mens rea element met
by the criminal negligence standard).
I See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 171-72 & n.3 (D. Mass. 1995);
Paust, supra note 64; Jordan J. Paust, Superior Orders and Command Responsibility, in

3

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT,

supra note 13, at 73, 78-85; extract

of Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1 Nov. 1948), in 3
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT,

supra note 13, at 141-42; id. at 163

(same basic points by Roling, J., dissenting); Anthony D'Amato, National Prosecution
for International Crimes, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT, supra
note 13, at 173; Anthony D'Amato, Superior Orders vs. Command Responsibility, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 604, 607-08 & n.1 (1986); Telford Taylor, remarks, in LAW AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN WARFARE 226-27 (Peter Trooboff ed. 1975); cf. William G.
Eckhardt, Command CriminalResponsibility:A Pleafor a Workable Standard, 97 MIL.
L. REV. 1 (1982); W. Hays Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL.
L. REV. 1 (1973). Professor Bassiouni affirms that such is the "applicable legal
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have had knowledge must be tested circumstantially and with respect
to a reasonable person in the same general position as the accused.
Thus, reasonable foreseeability is quite relevant.
Although slightly different, Article 7(3) of the Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia can be interpreted
to reflect the customary standard. The language of Article 7
recognizes responsibility if one "knew or had reason to know,"69 and
logically one "had reason to know" if under the circumstances one
should have known. As the Report of the Secretary-General states,
such language relates to an "imputed responsibility or criminal
negligence" and a "failure to prevent a crime or to deter the unlawful
behavior of his subordinates .
committed" crimes.7°

.

. or to punish those who had

Clearly erroneous, however, was the standard approved by
the Canadian Supreme Court in the Finta case. The dissent sought
to apply the customary knew or should have known test, 7 1 but Justice
Cory, writing for the majority, created a severely limiting knew or

standard." See BASSIOUNI, supra note 7, at 372 ("The applicable legal standard . . . is
the objective standard of 'reasonableness' in light of the existing circumstances, i.e.,
reasonableness in terms of... knowledge that should have been known."); see also id.
at 385-87 (otherwise misquoting U.S. Dep't of Army, FM 27-10). Nonetheless, in von
Leeb the mens rea standard concerning aggressive war was quite different. It was
expressed in terms of actual knowledge of illegality. See United States v. von Leeb,
supra note 64, at 488-90.
9 Supra note 20, at para. 59; see also The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Dusko Tadic,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, paras. 32-33, 35-36, 39, 41,
43, 45, 48 (July 24, 1995) ("knew or had reason to know . ..were about to . . . or had
done so and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent them from
doing so or to punish the perpetrators thereof."); In the Matter of a Proposal for a
Formal Request for Deferral to the Competence of the Tribunal re: Radovan Karadzic,
Ratko Mladic and Mico Stanisic, No. IT-95-5-D, International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, paras. 4, 17, 22-25 (May 16, 1995). These documents are available
on the
World
Wide Web at http://www.igc.apc.org/tribunal
(gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org :7030/1 1/cases).
70 Id. at para. 56. Although Article 7 expressly focuses on circumstances where a
"subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so," the background coverage
in paragraph 56 is broader (i.e., duty to prevent, deter, and repress) and there is no
indication that Article 7 seeks to cutback or exclude responsibility if criminal acts are
still occurring. In general, the Report's examples are illustrative and not meant to be
exclusive.
71 See supra note 36 (La Forest, J.opinion) (manuscript opinion at 43, 52-53, 55).
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"wilfully blind" test.72 The adoption of such a higher threshold for
leader responsibility underscores the danger of using national
tribunals for the prosecution of international crimes. In the United
States, the erroneous instructions in the trial of Captain Medina
concerning his actions and inactions at My Lai demonstrate the same
point.73
With respect to leader responsibility, it should also be

stressed that under international law there is to be no immunity for
those reasonably accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity.74
The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

seems to recognize this point," although it also contains a provision
for International Criminal Tribunal pardons or commutation of

n See id. (Cory, J. opinion) (manuscript opinion at 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 45). Justice
Cory also sought a ludicrous exculpation for "those who killed in the heat of battle or
in defense of their country." Id. (manuscript opnion at 38). Such an attempted limit of
responsibility has no basis in international law or fact. Numerous laws of war regulate
tactics and targets "in the heat of battle" or when soldiers especially seek to "defend"
their country. At most, "the heat of battle" might constitute a conditional aspect of
"circumstance," but never a blanket excuse for international crimes.
13 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 65; Paust, supra note 65, at 86.
7'See, e.g., Judgment and Opinion of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg
1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. at 221; Genocide Convention, supra note 47,
arts. I and IV; U.N. G.A. Res. 3074, supra note 47; Draft Articles on the Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (ILC first reading, 1991), art. 13,
at 25-26, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess. Supp. No. 10, at 238-50, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991);
Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment, supra note 17, principles I and III;
Charter of the IMT at Nuremberg, supra note 16, arts. 6 and 7; Bassiouni, Crimes
Against Humanity, supra note 13, at 62-65; Paust, supra note 25, at 221-32; Paust,
supra note 48, at 337-40; Jordan J. Paust, Correspondence, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 715-17
(1994); cf. BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CODE, supra note 16, at 103-04
(proposal). With respect to civil sanctions, see also Kadic v. Karadzic,70 F.3d 232 (2d
Cir. 1995); Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War Crimes and
Hostage-Taking, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 351, 374-78 (1991); Memorandum Amicus Curiae
of Law Professors, Kadic v. Karadzic, No. 94-9069 (2d Cir. 1995).
71 See Secretary General Report, supra note 20, at paras. 54-57, 59 (art. 7); see also
Steven J. Lepper, remarks, 88 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 248 (1994) (noting that the
Tribunal rejected witness immunity when formulating its rules of procedure). Although
no state can lawfully grant any form of immunity, supra note 71, an international
tribunal should be allowed to grant witness immunity in appropriate cases. A statute for
a permanent tribunal should provide for such a power.
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76
sentences after conviction.

III. U.S. Courts and Tribunals
Given the International Criminal Tribunal's number of prior
accused, even with more permanent international criminal tribunals
humankind will remain dependent on national prosecutions for
adequate enforcement of international criminal law. From the above,
it is evident that national laws and prosecutorial efforts need to be
consistent with international law." It would be most appropriate for
the U.N. Secretary-General to become involved in efforts to assure
compliance with international standards and general uniformity in
domestic laws, especially concerning war crimes and crimes against
humanity.
Perhaps the International Law Commission could
recommend the creation of an entity charged with the study of
domestic laws and the power to receive reports on domestic
legislation and prosecutions from members of the United Nations and
to make suggestions, even as an arm of a permanent International
Criminal Tribunal. Since fundamental human rights78 and norms jus
cogens79 are at stake, perhaps the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights could also initiate such a study and effort.
In the case of the United States, it appears that most crimes
against humanity occurring in time of armed conflict can be
prosecuted in federal district courts8" or in military tribunals. 8 Other

76 Id. at paras. 123-124 (and art. 28).

This approach is contained in the 1994 ILC

Report, supra note 32, at 140-41.
' See also Wexler, supra note 13, at 363, 367.
78 See supra note 13.
" See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 47, § 702 and cmt. n; Paust, supra note 57, at 92 & n.3.
I See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crime Jurisdiction Over
Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEx. L. REV. 6 (1971), reprinted in 4 THE
VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 447 (R. Falk ed. 1976); Paust, supra note 48,
at 341-44. Since every violation of the laws of war is a war crime (see, e.g., U.S.
Dep't of Army, FM 27-10, supra note 47, at 178, para. 499) coverage is potentially
broad.
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United States' laws might also reach certain aspects of the general
crime, 2 but a United States statute addressing crimes against
humanity as such would be most useful and is long overdue. Clearly,
the definition should be patterned after the customary international
instruments and not severely limiting approaches like that found in
the Rwandan Statute. Alternatively, a U.S. statute could simply
incorporate crimes against humanity under international law by
reference. 83

The United States should also enact a new statute addressing
genocide as defined in international law.84 Accountability after
Nuremberg also demands that the United States take seriously its
obligation to initiate the prosecution or extradition of alleged Nazi
war criminals. We have the ability to prosecute, but have failed
humanity by a persistent refusal to prosecute. 5
Conclusion

Instead of evolving in policy-oriented fashion to reach even

sj See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Army, FM 27-10, supra note 47, at p. 178, paras. 498-99,
at p. 180, para. 505, at p. 182, para. 507; Robinson 0. Everett & Scott L. Silliman,
Forumsfor Punishing Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
509 (1994); Paust, supra note 76, at 7-8.
82 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2332; 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1994).
83 See supra note 25. The legislation could read:
§ 1098. Crimes Against Humanity.
(a) Whoever commits a crime against humanity
as defined by customary international law shall
be fined not more than $10,000,000, or
imprisoned not more than fifty years, or both,
unless subsection (b) is applicable.
(b) Whoever commits such an offense in such a
way that the death of another human being
results therefrom shall be subject to a penalty of
life imprisonment.
(c) Whoever commits such an offense shall be
liable to pay damages to any victim of such an
offense and whoever is alleged to have
committed such an offense shall not be entitled to
any form of immunity from civil remedies.
See Paust, supra note 57, at 101 & n.32.
See, e.g., Paust, supra note 48, at 342-44.
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more human rights, relatively recent attempts have been made to limit
the customary reach of crimes against humanity. Such efforts should
be opposed. They demonstrate as well that crimes against humanity
are too important to be left to states. The international community
needs to assure that domestic and international definitions and
prosecutorial efforts reflect and not deny customary international law.
The same point pertains with respect to drafting efforts by the
International Law Commission and the supervisory role of the
General Assembly.
Words that should not appear in any appropriate definition of
crimes against humanity or as limits of responsibility include: serious,
widespread, systematic, large-scale, deliberate policy, grave, cruel,
terrible, grievous, misery, suffering, barbarous, vile, state policy, on
behalf of a state, state, ideology, common plan, or "substantial
part."8 6 Also, the two forms of crimes against humanity recognized
at Nuremberg should not be fused into one more limited crime.
Additionally, the customary international instruments remain as
background for interpretation or incorporation by reference with
respect to any relevant domestic laws or international statutes not
expressly or only partly limited. Where no relevant domestic law
exists or where limiting laws exist, appropriate legislation should be
enacted.
PROFESSOR CHEN: Thank you, Professor Paust, for giving us a
succinct international overview concerning accountability after
Nuremberg.
Professor Robert Goldman

s The word "substantial" was added to the erroneous U.S. definition of genocide to
cover only acts committed with intent to destroy a relevant group "in whole or
substantial part." See supra note 57. The word "substantial" was also given a peculiar
and severely restrictive meaning. Id. Nonetheless, since the legislation was enacted
before the treaty was ratified, the treaty should prevail over clashing and more limiting
provisions in the legislation under the last in time rule. One such provision is § 1093(8),
a far more limiting part of the definition not found in the Convention or in the attempted
U.S. "understandings" that, if allowed, would operate as a reservation. The same
general point pertains with respect to § 1091(d).
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Our next speaker is Professor Robert
PROFESSOR CHEN:
Goldman. Robert Goldman is Professor of Law and the Louis James
scholar at the Washington College of Law of The American
University in Washington, D.C. He is also Co-director of the Law
School's Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. Professor
Goldman is a member of the Executive Council of the Inter-American
Institute of Human Rights, the Policy Committee of Human Rights
Watch, and the advisory committees of Human Rights Watch/
Americas, Middle East, and Helsinki. He is the author of The
Protection of Human Rights in the Americas: Past, Present and
Future, and has co-authored many human rights reports.
Professor Goldman will provide us with a regional perspective
by reference to the experience of the Inter-American system.
Professor Goldman.
PROFESSOR ROBERT GOLDMAN: Thank you, Professor.
First of all, I want to thank the organizers for inviting me
here today. It is a pleasure to be here. I want to particularly
congratulate the students. It is hard organizing these things, and it
is a late time of the year, and you should be commended for what
you do.
It is also a pleasure to be at any event that recognizes and
honors Telford Taylor for all the major contributions he has made
over the years.
I have been really grappling with what I should talk
about-the issue of accountability, impunity, and how this is
translated into practicabilities in the wake of Nuremberg. It is clear
that we are living in a very exciting era that can, in effect, make
major changes in how we view and how we deal with systematic
violations of norms that embody fundamental notions of human
dignity. Or, we can see them surrendered away as part of political
solutions, wherein the world engages in a form of collective and
forced amnesia.
In my work over the years, nothing has given me greater
satisfaction then having worked with or represented victims of the
rather gross human rights violations that occurred in South America.
When one deals with the issue of accountability, it becomes almost
synonymous with the sickness that has pervaded the Inter-American
system. In no area of the world have there been more states of
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emergency and states of exception from the perspective of human
rights, nor greater systemic violations of human rights due to the
existence of a system in which impunity became the rule. Amnesty,
in comparable measures, precluded not only truth telling, but also
precluded any kind of legal redress for victims-particularly when a
government shifts from authoritarian rule to a form of controlled
democracy.
The victims of these egregious human rights violations found
that they were no better off as plaintiffs under the new so-called
democratic government than when they were the victims under the
repressive regime. Indeed, the full measure and enjoyment of
citizenry was reserved for those who inflicted the torture and the
pain. The first act of the newly established government, or in which
it acquiesced, was to again become a party to an official policy of
contempt for the fundamental rights of citizens who had suffered.
And I say to you, no society is reconciled by a policy adopted by a
government of forced amnesia. In fact, that is exactly what has
happened primarily in Latin America until recently and you saw the
reaction.
Some of you have read the reaction of those of us who have
known about the events in Argentina concerning bodies washing up
on the shores of Uruguay and so forth. 87 Recently, an Argentine
confessed to involvement with the disposal of bodies of people while
they were still alive after having been tortured. There has been
conferred immunity making it virtually impossible to prosecute by
virtue of measures taken under Argentine law. 88
This bleak panorama has been ameliorated, to some extent,
by the efforts of courageous women and men in pressing a series of
claims before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in
the last several years. It was in that capacity that I was leading

I See, e.g., Kerry Luft & Laurie Goering, Confronting Horrors of the Past: Latin
America Comes to Terms with Tyranny, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19, 1995, at 3 (stating that a
former Argentine naval officer revealed that "he had pushed thirty prisoners out of
planes flying over the Atlantic, and that at least 1500 dissidents had died on similar
flights in 1977 and 1978").
1 See generally Eugene Robinson, Coups and Democracy:Lessons From LatinAmerica,
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1991, at C5 (discussing the difficulties in transforming
dictatorships into democracies and the compromises necessary to keep the fragile
democracies from collapsing).
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counsel for a period of almost fifteen years representing victims in
Uruguay.
In many of the cases that deal with impunity, one has to
understand the differences between the applicable laws. In the cases
of Latin America there were "dirty wars," but they were not wars. 9
The states became terrorists and instituted policies, in some cases, of
exterminating their own citizens. Except for small groups that were
almost immediately wiped out, there was no armed conflict within the
meaning of international humanitarian law, that is, the Geneva
Conventions. 9" Therefore, neither Article 391 nor the additional
protocol would apply. 92 We are not dealing with war crimes and we
are certainly not dealing with grave breaches because that would have
been non-international in nature anyway.
And then we also deal with impunity that has been conferred
as a result of genuine armed conflicts; specifically, those that have
occurred-some of which were ongoing-in the Andean region of

9 See Kerry Luft & Laurie Goering, Latin American Atrocities Continue To Come To

Light: Human Rights Groups Keep Spotlight on Region's 'Dirty Wars', CHI. TRIB., Apr.
2, 1995, at A23 (describing human rights abuses in Latin America).
o The Geneva Conventions are a group of international treaties which define general
principles of conduct to be followed in time of war. TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG
AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 28 (1970).
The most recent Geneva
Conventions, concluded in 1949, are: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protections of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
9, Article 3, common to all four Geneva Conventions, applies to the case of noninternational armed conflict. See Laura Lopez, Uncivil Wars: The ChallengeofApplying
InternationalHumanitarianLaw to Internal Armed Conflict, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917,
924 (1994).
I In 1977, two protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention were opened for signature:
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 2, 21, [hereinafter Protocol I] (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); and Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 610,
[hereinafter Protocol II] (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).

1995]

PANEL 11

573

Peru,9 3 Colombia,94 Nicaragua,95 and El Salvador.96 Now, the law is
different depending upon the difficulty that one has in trying to find
accountability.
The principal instruments that govern human rights are
perpetrator-oriented and require states' parties, in effect, to ferret out
and prosecute individuals. Some very specific exceptions are the
ones that the non-governmental organization (NGO) community has
sponsored, 97 such as the Torture Convention,9" and the one that now
deals with forced disappearances in the Inter-American system. 99 The
principal human rights instruments that were either in effect or came
into effect for parties, without going into all the procedural
ramifications in the cases against Uruguay and Argentina and so
forth, specify state responsibility for violations." °
Nowhere are there specific provisions that typify breaches of

93 See, e.g., William R. Long, Regional Outlook: 'Dirty War' Debate Refuses to
Die-Human Rights Abuses Are Being Forgiven But Not Forgotten in Latin America,
L.A.TIMES, July 25, 1995, at 1 (citing a Peruvian law which grants qualified immunity
to military personnel accused of human rights abuses).
I See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, Colombia May Take Amnesty to UN Forum, GUARDIAN,
May 27, 1994, at 14 (stating that the Colombian government permits the military to
"arrest, torture, [and] murder . . . people throughout Colombia").
95 See, e.g., Tracy Wilkinson, A Legacy of Conflict, Confision...L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17,
1993, at IA (stating that the Nicaraguan government's amnesty program grants immunity
to the guerrillas).
I See, e.g., Tracy Wilkinson, Decade of War Leaves Lasting Scars on CentralAmerica;
Strong MilitariesContinue to Thwart the Building of Democracies, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1993, at 41A (stating that human rights abusers will "escape punishment . . . [and] the
issue of immunity [is] the most troubling aspect of continued military power").
97 See, e.g., EDMUND J. OSMANCZYK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 565 (1985) (defining a non-governmental organization
(NGO) as "any international organization not established by intergovernmental
agreement").
98 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess,, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/39/6 (1985).
99 Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1529 (1994).
100See, e.g., LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 1-2 (1992) (stating that almost all existing
rules of international responsibility bind states only, because the state is usually the
institution vested with principal legal authority and power to regulate life, liberty, and
property in society; the individual is only bound in exceptional circumstances).
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the provision entailing individual penal responsibility. But just as this
was an issue at Nuremberg, people were successfully prosecuted for
violations of the laws and customs of war, and indeed for violations
of what was contained in provisions of the 1929 Geneva
Conventions,"°' Prisoner of War (POW) Convention, 102 and the Hague
Conventions° 3 -these
were the only provisions for state
responsibility. Nonetheless, the court properly established that states
do not violate the law in this context."0 4 Individuals violate the law
in the course of an armed conflict, and the same is true under human
rights law. Nuremberg played a role for us in persuading the
Commission to take the step in declaring the amnesties in Uruguay
and Argentina to be in violation of their obligations to respect the
Convention because they precluded criminal investigation and
prosecution of state agents. This in large measure rested on arguing
the analogy.
Some of the members realized that there was no provision
establishing individual penal responsibility. But just as there were
none in Nuremberg, and as we found, the principle provisions in the
Hague Conventions and the 1929 Conventions had been assimilated
into customary international law,' 05 so too, do the nonjudicial
provisions in human rights instruments share the same exact
value-that the nonjudicial provisions are found in humanitarian law
and particularly in the "grave breach" provisions. What difference
does it make, as a practical matter, whether the victims are raped,
murdered, or eviscerated if because of the way the particular incident
is qualified one group of perpetrators get off but the other group must
be prosecuted? There is something perverse about this, and I think

101

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Forces in Time of War,

Aug. 12, 1949, Part III, arts. 33-34, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3538-40, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 308-10
(prohibiting hostage-taking, collective punishment, and reprisals).
102 Geneva Convention III, supra note 74.
103Convention Respecting Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), Annex, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, L.N.T.S. 343; Convention with Respect to the Laws &
Customs of War by Land (Hague II), July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 98 U.N.T.S. 93.
'o See JudicialDecisions, InternationalMilitary Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and
Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 221 (1947) (referring to the enforcement of the
principle of individual responsibility at the Nuremberg trials).
15 See Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L
L. 348, 358-60 (1987).
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the Commission understood that.
The result of the Commission's decisions in finding that the
state failed in its obligation to investigate and criminally prosecute
agents is an extremely important result. However, the decision in
terms of its rationality and predictability is not terribly good in the
legal sense. These cases had been cited three years before we knew
we won them legally. It was a political battle. Why? Because
accountability, or holding states responsible and requiring them to
perform obligations, both to deter others and to rehabilitate victims,
is a terrible political problem. Many argue that because it is a
terrible political problem it should obviate the obligations of the state
06
to comply. 1
Additionally, there are now a series of other cases pending
before the Inter-America Commission.0 7 One of these cases is
against Nicaragua, which will involve these same kinds of issues,
and, hopefully, the court will once-and-for-all clearly establish this
obligation.' What is hopeful, as a result, is that we are seeing that
the situation in Rwanda, unlike the situation in Yugoslavia which is
an international civil war, 09 is handled as an interstate armed conflict
regarding all grave breaches, making it much easier to establish

"o See, e.g., Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy
in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, 25 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 393, 509 (1994) ("[The] extent to which member states'
commitment to representative democracy remains heavily qualified by their political
judgments.").
107 See Dinah Shelton, The Jurisprudenceof the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 333, 336 (1994). Four cases are pending before the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The "Caballero Delgado and Santana" case
involves Colombia, the "Jean Paul Genie Lacayo" case involves Nicaragua, the
"fourteen murdered fishermen" case involves Venezuela, and the remaining "Chipoco
and Peruvian Prison action" involves Peru. Id. at 336 & n.24.
1o See Filadelfo Aleman, Ortega Confined to Capitalin Probe of Killing, Associated
Press, Mar. 22, 1994, availablein WESTLAW, ALLNEWS database, ASSOCPR File,
1994 WL 10117459 (referring to the case against Nicaragua before the Inter-America
Court of Human Rights involving the 1990 shooting of sixteen year-old Jean Paul
Genie).
109 See, e.g., Charles L. Nier III, The Yugoslavia Civil War: An Analysis of the
Applicability of the Laws of War Governing Non-International Armed Conflicts in the
Modern World, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 303, 303-04 (1992).
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individual penal responsibility for such breaches.""
The conflict in Rwanda is a civil war. To that extent,
jurisprudence in Rwanda and the war crimes trials that may ensue in
Ethiopia will signal that humanity has arrived at the point of
recognition. We need not engage in labor mongering. That is, that
there is a certain common nucleus of value in times of peace and in
times of war, which are at the highest level of international concern
and policy; that state agents or non-governmental agents who willfully
violate these values will incur individual penal responsibility for such
breach and that responsibility cannot be terminated by fiat.
Let me tell you what an amnesty does. An amnesty is so
anti-juridical in the sense that you have monitoring bodies and groups
like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Lawyers'
Committee for Human Rights, who track long periods of systemic
violations, but then you have the Commissions decide issues and call
on governments to do things and then in the end, the state, for
purposes of pacification, will introduce a piece of paper and plead it
as a total bar to any further consideration. If that is not picking and
choosing what law you are going to be bound by, I do not know what
is. It is certainly elemental that a state cannot pick and choose what
law it is going to be bound by, if it exists as law, and that it cannot
plead even a referendum or a constitution as a valid excuse for noncompliance with international legal obligations. This is the hopeful
part, and I will conclude with my observations about what disturbs
me.
There is a two-tract policy, both internationally and frequently
on the regional level, to try to solve many of the problems that are
either holdovers from the Cold War or involve other kinds of
long-term tensions that have erupted from time to time.
Haiti is a very good example. Haiti was not a Cold War
issue, but an issue where United States policy and United Nations
policy determined that dictatorship and the overthrowing of
governments would not stand."'

o See, e.g.,

Making Rules for War; the World Tries Again,

ECONOMIST,

Mar. 11,

1995, at 21, 23 (discussing the obstacles which slow attempts to bring war criminals to
justice).
" See W. Michael Reisman, Agora: The 1994 U.S. Action in Haiti: Haiti and the
Validity of InternationalAction, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 84 (1995).
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But when the principal body, charged by the member states
of the Organization of American States (OAS)," 2 had elaborated,
jurisprudence indicated that the states had a duty to prosecute murder,
torture, and disappearances. However, at the same time, those same
political actors, in the form of the United Nations and the OAS, were
urging the lawful president of Haiti to grant amnesty-not just for the
political acts of insurrection and overflow, but for murder, torture,
and disappearance." 3 Either the international community is serious
about punishing murder, torture, and disappearance, or it is not.
One of the concerns that I have regarding Yugoslavia is the
degree to which the international support for the extremely valuable
work of the tribunal will begin to wane as the Serbs become more
willing to accommodate the wishes of the international community.
Will we get the same degree of cooperation? Will the tribunal get
money? We must be serious about this.
But in conclusion, I would just like to say that these things do
matter. Telford Taylor and others have tremendously influenced
people like myself in framing arguments and in using whatever
modest legal skills we may have to deal with this issue, which is as
ugly in many cases as what happened to the Guatemalan Indians." 4
It has been similarly ugly for the Jews in Eastern Europe who have
been suffering during the past ten or twelve years. They have had
their own holocaust, and there are many other holocausts going on
elsewhere in the world today." 5

...The Organization of American States (OAS) is composed of 34 North, South, and
Central American and Caribbean nations. It is devoted to the strengthening of security
and

the settlement

of disagreements

in the

region.

GUISEPPE

SCHIAVONE,

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A DICTIONARY AND DIRECTORY 198 (1992).

113 See The Human Rights Situation in Haiti and Its Implications, PreparedStatement
of Ian Martin, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, before
the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, Senate Foreign
RelationsCommittee, June 28, 1994, availablein WESTLAW, FEDNSWASH database,
1994 WL 8370992.
114See Russel L. Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 277, 283 (1993) ("[In] Guatemala, a succession of regimes backed by the
United States have conducted a vicious war of extermination against a Mayan Indian
majority for nearly thirty years.").
15 See, e.g., Anthony Bazcarich, Holocaust in Bosnia, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1993, at
B6; Hutu Holocaust.-Rwanda's Ethnic 'FinalSolution,' ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May
22, 1994, at 41A.

578

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XII

For the students today, there is more potential for you to
work with groups and to go out and make a difference. I want to
commend, to all of you, the life and example of Telford Taylor, and
his peers, for what they did. You have tremendous opportunities and
one, indeed, can make a difference; so go out and do it. Thank you.
PROFESSOR CHEN: Thank you, Professor Goldman, for sharing
with us the accountability and immunity issues in the Inter-America
context, and also for a very positive note.
ProfessorLouis Henkin
PROFESSOR CHEN:
Louis Henkin is University Professor
Emeritus and Special Service Professor at Columbia University.
Prior to his entry into the academic world, he had a distinguished
career in the Department of State, serving in various capacities.
Professor Henkin is a former President of the American Society of
International Law and the Chief Reporter of the Restatement Third of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States.
His numerous
publications include: How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy;
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution; The Age of Rights; and Cases
and Materials on InternationalLaw.
His most recent book is International Law, Politics and
Values. I am not going to send him a bill for that, but it is a great
privilege to present to you Professor Henkin.
PROFESSOR LOUIS HENKIN: Thank you, Professor Chen. I do
want to join those who have expressed gratitude to Dean Wellington,
Professor Teitel and her colleagues, and especially to the student
body. But, most of all, I am pleased to be here to join the
celebration honoring my colleague, Telford Taylor. I wish I had a
contribution close to the spirit of the day, but I have been asked to be
a commentator. As a commentator, I am a moving target because I
am supposed to comment on what I have heard, as well as on what
I have not heard.
Listening to Professor Paust and Professor Goldman, I find
their insights rich and even inspiring. I have no doubt that if I could
stay to the end I would be equally inspired by what my colleagues
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Professor Deak, Professor Hoffman, Mr. Kritz, and Professor
Bassiouni, who will not be here until later, have to say. However,
I can only assume that I know what they will say. On that
assumption, I will make my comments and if I am wrong I will hear
about it.
I would like to say a few words about the title of the
afternoon session, "Comparative Analysis of International and
National Tribunals." As often happens with a title of that kind, one
can, in the time that it takes, comment on it from various
perspectives, which makes the job of an interloping commentator a
little easier. I think one can answer: should we choose between
national and international community, or what are the terms of our
choice and arguments of principle. But even then, one may have to
decide which different principles we pay homage to. There are
arguments of effectiveness, and that, of course, implies agreement on
the goals and purposes and, presumably, by effectiveness, we mean
that which will contribute to the cause of justice. But even the cause
of justice has its ambiguities, as you have just heard from the two
previous speakers.
Inevitably, with a case of this kind, one might be dealing with
Nuremberg, but I am not sure Nuremberg is a successful example for
what concerns this panel. This is because, in part, it was unique and
because it was the product of certain times and circumstances. And
I am not sure we can base our decisions about Rwanda or the former
Yugoslavia on what we did in Nuremberg. However, it is the only
example, the only instance we have. Therefore, one should not
neglect or overlook Nuremberg; although, I do not think one can
build as sturdily upon it as one would like, now, fifty years later.
In principle, I think, one should lean toward national law and
national tribunals.
In fact, international law, including the
international law of human rights, always looks to national law and
national tribunals. They were never intended to replace national law.
We have not moved away from a state system and we are not likely
to do so in the foreseeable years. International law and international
tribunals, when used, are designed to make national law effective.
In fact, international lawyers will tell you that the exhaustion of
domestic remedies is a prerequisite for any resort to international law
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and international remedies. 116
While we are talking more about human rights law and
humanitarian law, rather than international law, generally, I suspect
that the same principles apply." 7 That is, one should, if possible,
resort to national legal systems and national tribunals, which have all
kinds of things going for them. We must keep in mind; of course,
that when we talk about national tribunals, we are talking not only
about the tribunals of the society in which violations took place, but
also about the possibilities of other nations making their laws and
tribunals available for the purposes that we are talking about.
Why are we talking about international tribunals here? Well,
for one thing, because the national tribunals and national laws are
obviously inadequate. We have had gross violations in the past fifty
years, which include crimes, leaving aside Nuremberg, as horrendous
as genocide, torture, disappearances, and all kinds of things that you
have heard about from the previous speakers."18 But we have had
few national courts apply national law. Not only have we not had
national courts apply national law in the countries where the
violations took place, in part for the reason Professor Goldman told
us about-amnesties and the need to try and bring peace and
reconciliation-but other nations sometimes talked about it and found
that their legal systems were not fit for it. Maybe they cannot be
used to punish crimes committed in another country but that is a
subject of its own.
There are also procedural obstacles and constitutional
obstacles of due process of law. These obstacles explain why the
See, e.g., Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 375
(1993) (stating that the injured alien has to exhaust available remedies under the legal
system of the state causing the injury before seeking reparation through a state-to-state
claim); Gates Garrity-Roukos & Raymond H. Brescia, ProceduralJustice and Human
Rights: Towards a ProceduralJurisprudencefor Human Rights Tribunals, 18 YALE J.
INT'L L. 559, 569 n.45 (1993).
"I See e.g., Theodor Meron & Mary M. McCarthy, State Responsibilityfor Violations
of Human Rights, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 372, 376-78 (1989). According to the
European Court of Human Rights, international law requires exhaustion of the state's
legal system prior to answering to an international body only when it is available to the
persons involved and is sufficient for redressing their complaints. Id.
118 See, e.g., Arlene Levinson, Modern Life, Mass Death, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
NC), Sept. 17, 1995, at A23 (citing examples of human suffering at the hands of
organized governments).
116
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United States, as well as other countries, have not tried to make their
laws or their tribunals available for the trial and punishment of the
crimes which we have been talking about." 9 So I think we need
international tribunals sometimes, somewhere, as I think we did at
Nuremberg, and I think we do now in the former Yugoslavia.
The first thing you might note, as I mentioned, is that we
have not had any international tribunals since Nuremberg, and that
the first one since Nuremberg is the one you see now in the former
Yugoslavia. Why not? I think there are several reasons worth
keeping in mind.
First, it is part of a larger problem: the unwillingness of
states to commit what is necessary to the implementation of human
rights. I am not talking only about international communities. We
have not been able to get international enforcement of human rights
by much less "intrusive"-a word that the Russian communists like
to use-methods of trying to get people to appear before a national
foreign court or an international tribunal. 2 ' There has been a basic
unwillingness to see human rights enforced by what you and I might
consider effective means, and that is something we forget.
The international instruments are excellent, wonderful
instruments. But their implementation has been, remains, and I am
afraid is likely to remain, permanent. Therefore, if we are not going
to have a successful, hard-nosed human rights commissioner, which
we finally have, and effective human rights commissions, at least on
the universal level-I am not talking about America or Europe-then
the notion that we would suddenly produce international tribunals
seems unlikely and has proven unlikely. I remind you that the
Genocide Convention, drafted in 1948, explicitly refers to the
possibility of an international tribunal."'2 But even for the crime of
genocide, no one dared to resist signing the treaty, except for the

"9 See, e.g., Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an
International Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 77 (1995).
120 See generally Note, JudicialEnforcement of InternationalLaw Against the Federal
and State Governments, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1269 (1991) (discussing reasons why
litigants and judges are reluctant to enforce internationally created rights).
12 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 281-82 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the United
States Feb. 23,1989).
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United States, for forty years. 122 But that is another subject for
another panel-no one dares say we should not have tribunals to
punish genocide, and yet we have not had even one for genocide in
the intervening fifty years.
And, of course, the big obstacle, in addition to the inherent
unwillingness of states to get involved and to expend diplomatic
capital for the vindication of rights of human beings in other
countries, was the Cold War. During the Cold War, there was
strong resistance to international enforcement. I hasten to say that
the resistance was not only from the communists, plural. I stress that
not only were we not prepared to move in that direction ourselves,
neither were any of the Western European democratic allies. 123
The end of the Cold War might, if you will, explain a lot of
things. It explains why we did not have international tribunals before
then and it might explain why we suddenly find ourselves considering
again the notion of international tribunals after forty-five to fifty
years. The end of the Cold War was necessary for this development.
As my colleagues in the political science world would say: necessary
but not sufficient. And so we have had that obstacle removed and
then, of course, we needed something else in order to move to the
international tribunal. One is the terrible, unmentionable events of
the kind we are talking about in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and
other places in varying degrees. 2 4 And, of course, there would be
no pressure to create international tribunals when they did not seem
to be necessary; but we now know the need is there. One should
expect that we might move toward international tribunals, as in fact,
we have.
We are moving towards an age of at least considering
international tribunals because national tribunals and national legal
systems have not been effective. There is no sign, now that the Cold

"2The Convention has been adopted by the United States and codified as 18 U.S.C.

§
1091(d) (1994). Id.
123See, e.g., Bill Powell et al., Lessons of Nuremberg, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 1995, at

52 ("By 1949 the cold war was on, and the Western allies' appetite for more trials had
waned considerably.").
124 See, e.g., Human-Rights Group Reports Worldwide Increase in Large-Scale
Violations,

DALLAS DAILY

NEWS,

July

6,

1995,

at

13A

(citing

AMNESTY

INTERNATIONAL, REPORT 1995, which documents incidents of torture occurring in 120
countries in 1994 as compared to 96 countries in 1992).
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War is over, that national tribunals will be effective in the future.
There is no sign that national tribunals will bring justice. The risks
are known and they are relevant to any discussion of Yugoslavia or
its related tribunal, which will operate in Rwanda. One such risk is,
of course, the great risk of white-washing by national courts.
I heard the suggestion that Albert Speer was supposed to have
said that he was glad to have been tried by an international tribunal
because if he had been tried by a German court, he would have been
hanged. 125 The person who made the comment was a little skeptical.
He might have been hanged. He might have been white-washed and,
therefore, the problem of national courts, especially in the context we
are talking about-the context of the kinds of crimes involved in the
high political places and deep ideological issues-are not likely to get
the kind of judgment by national courts that we would like.
An alternative to whitewashing is retribution. Retribution
may be a perfectly acceptable purpose of the criminal legal system in
some countries, and perhaps with most people, but it would not be
retribution based on the rule of law and on due process of law. So
I think we are certainly in the situation where we cannot count on
national communities. Therefore, we have to move towards this, as
we have in the former Yugoslavia.
We should support the
Yugoslavian War Crimes Tribunal in every way we can. We may
hear more from people representing tribunals before this afternoon is
out.
I am not saying that it is getting the kind of national support,
in terms of personnel, that it will require. What I am saying is that
it will require cooperation, although I am not confident that it will get
that cooperation. And, therefore, I think we are all engaged in a
necessary undertaking: if you want to see the rule of law amongst the
states in regard to human beings and their human rights in particular,

.

See generallyENCYCLOPEDIA

OF THE HOLOCAUST 1395-96

(Israel Gutman ed. 1990)

[hereinafter HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA] (Albert Speer was the German Minister of
Armament from 1942 to 1945; he employed forced labor and concentration camp
prisoners, and even though he was found guilty of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, he was sentenced to only 20 years of imprisonment.); BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ,
LESS THAN SLAVES, JEWISH FORCED LABOR AND THE QUEST FOR COMPENSATION 31-32
(1979) (citing instances where others were sentenced to death and noting that Albert
Speer received a sentence of 20 years imprisonment from the International Military
Tribunal).
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it will take vigilance, cooperation, and support and I wish I were
more confident that it is forthcoming. Thank you very much for your
courtesy in allowing me to speak.
PROFESSOR CHEN: Thank you very much, Professor Henkin, for
injecting a keen sense of realism into us living and operating under
a nation's state system. As Professor Henkin just reminded us, one
should read national law and national tribunals. Now we are shifting
our focus to the national experience in dealing with the question of
accountability.

Professor Istvan Deak
PROFESSOR CHEN: Our next speaker is Professor Istvan Deak.
Professor Deak is Professor of History at Columbia University. He
is the former Director of the Institute on East Central Europe at
Columbia. Professor Deak is a member of the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences and a former President of the Conference of Slovak and
Eastern European History. He is a prolific writer. His books,
Weimar Germany's Left-Wing Intellectuals; The Lawful Revolution;
and Beyond Nationalism were awarded book prizes. His book review
essays have regularly appeared in the New York Review of Books, and
have dealt with, among other topics, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and
Nuremberg. Professor Deak will speak on Nazi collaborators and
war criminals before the People's Courts, which were set up in
Western and Eastern Europe after World War II. Professor Deak.
PROFESSOR ISTVAN DEAK: My goal is to talk about the national
tribunals or People's Courts which- functioned in formerly
Nazi-occupied Europe.
Following World War II, thousands of judiciary bodies sat in
judgment over collaborators and war criminals in all the countries of
Europe which had been under the sway of Nazi Germany.126 Most

126

See generally HOLOCAUST

ENCYCLOPEDIA,

supra note 109, at 1489 (stating that

trials of "minor" war criminals were conducted by military and national courts held in
former Axis territory zones occupied by the victorious powers or in liberated territories
where the crimes took place).
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of these courts were set up spontaneously, but in countries formerly
allied to Germany, the creation of the tribunals had been actually
mandated by the armistice agreements.' 27
Understandably, we have no precise figures on the number of
people tried by the national courts for collaboration and war crimes,
but it is no exaggeration to say that they numbered well over one
million. 128 Hundreds of thousands of sentences were passed, ranging
in severity from loss of civil rights to imprisonment, hard labor, and
capital punishment. 129 Hundreds of thousands went to prison and
thousands were executed. 130
131
In some countries, the trials began well before liberation.
In Poland, for instance, one of the chief activities of the underground
movement was to try collaborators for treason. 132 The secret
tribunals imitated the regular courts, passing sentences after due
2I See, e.g., Matthew Lippman, Towards an International Criminal Court, 3 SAN

DIEGO JUST. J. 1, 46 n.245 (stating that national courts' exclusive jurisdiction of postwar prosecution could be overcome by the terms of an armistice or a peace treaty); cf.
Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention:A Challenge to Civilization,
8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229, 232 (1995) (stating that Article VI of the Genocide
Convention which mandates persons charged with genocide "shall be tried by a
competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed" appears
to be unrealistic).
1' See Steven Fogelson, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 833 (1990) (stating that the United States charged three and one half million
Germans, tried less than one million, and sentenced less than ten thousand to prison).
See generally Jay L. Chavkin, The Man Without a Country: The Just Deserts of John
Demjanjuk, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 769, 793 n.185 (1995) (stating that the national
courts of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Greece, France, the Netherlands, Poland,
the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia tried thousands of Nazis); Terrance Petty, 50th
Anniversary ofNuremberg Trials Marked but ProsecutorLaments War Crimes Continue,
DENVER POST, Nov. 26, 1995, at 31 (asserting that, apart from the tribunal at
Nuremberg, thousands of war criminals were prosecuted by national courts in formerly
Nazi-occupied countries).
29 See HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 109, at 1488.
See id. at 1508-12.
See Jonathan A. Bush, Nuremburg: The Modern Law of War and Its Limitations, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 2022, 2037 (1993) (discussing how Nuremberg "represented only the
apex of a mammoth process of legal reckoning because hundreds of Nazis and Nazi
collaborators were tried months before Nuremburg").
132 See HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 109, at 1514 (stating that the first war
crimes trial in Poland was held from November 27 to December 2, 1944, when there
was still fighting).
'3

'3'
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deliberation and, when possible, in the presence of the accused.
However, if it was impossible to produce the defendant, then
members 'of the resistance were entrusted by the court with the
execution of the sentence at the earliest opportunity.' 33
For a short period after the war, there was something
resembling a European consensus on the need to punish those who
had committed major crimes against fellow nationals under the
protection of the German authorities. Yet perhaps even more
significant were the administrative purges that took place at the same
time. 134 Several million persons, mostly public officials, were
dismissed from their posts in a change of guards amounting to
something like a social revolution.135 Note, however, that the purge
of the traditional elites had begun much earlier, during the war, when
fascists and collaborators were dismissing many members of the old
regime.
Astonishingly, the postwar criminal procedures and
administrative purges were rather similar everywhere, regardless of
whether they were taking place in Soviet-occupied Eastern or in
British-American-occupied Western and Southern Europe. One
reason for this similarity was that the People's Courts were manned
nearly everywhere by representatives of the political parties in the
resistance movement, within which the Communists invariably played
a significant role. Parties of the anti-fascist coalition wished to rid
themselves of their wartime enemies and rivals so as to legitimize
their own assumption of power. Whereas the ultimate goal of the
Western Allies was to return to the rule of law,' 36 the aim of the
Soviets was to subvert "bourgeois" rule, if possible in Europe as a

133

Id.

134See Mark Gibney, Decommunization: Human Rights Lessons from the Past and
Present, and Prospectsfor the Future, 23 DENV. J. INT'L & POL'Y, 87, 97-98 (1994).
131 Id. (discussing penalties imposed on collaborators, including being purged from
government service).
13 See Kathryn Hendley, The Spillover Effects of Privatization on Russian Legal
Culture, 5 TRANSNAT'L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 41 (1995) (stating that the rule of
law "applies in equal measure to the powerful and the non-powerful and that legal
institutions have sufficient authority and independence to make the remedies imposed
against the powerful meaningful").

1995]

PANEL 11

587

whole, if not then at least in Eastern Europe. 1 7 As for the resistance
forces, whether in Norway or in Hungary, they generally hoped to
create a more virtuous and more just society within a somewhat
authoritarian but still democratic welfare state.
The great Allied Powers, with the exception of the United
States, played only a limited role in the trials and administrative
purges, and American enthusiasm for de-Nazification quickly
evaporated as the Cold War began around 1947. In Austria, for
instance, the Soviets rarely if ever played a direct role in the
activities of those courts. 38
The courts were faced with a multiplicity of grave problems,
one of them being the unwillingness of the new regimes to admit how
extensive collaboration had been under German rule. The official
theory held then, and often still held today, was that almost all the
crimes had been committed by the Germans, assisted by a handful of
traitors. 319 The population at large, even if it remained passive, so
the theory held, had refused to collaborate. On the other hand,
resistance in one form or another was a genuine national
movement. 140 The reality was quite different. There were, in every
occupied country, more individuals willing to give a hand to the
Germans than to fight them."'4 Such non-Germans, for instance, who
joined the Waffen-SS and thus manifested their readiness to risk their
lives on behalf of Third Reich, were at least as numerous as such

Id. (stating that the Soviet political and legal establishments regarded the concept of
the rule of law as hopelessly bourgeois).
,8 See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 209
(1992) (stating that "[as] a group the Russians were part of the war crimes community,
but as individuals they were in but not of it" and "[the] only requests the Russians [put
forward] were for minor omissions in [the] documents or briefs, when a phrase or fact
touched a tender nerve").
"9 See, e.g., THE BLACK BOOK: THE NAZI CRIME AGAINST THE JEWISH PEOPLE 4-10
(The Jewish Black Book Comm., 1946); EUGENE DAVISON, THE TRIAL OF THE
GERMANS 3 (1966).
140 See, e.g., Guyora Binder, Comment, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity
at the Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1325 (1989) (stating that Klaus Barbie
alone executed more than 4000 members of the French resistance).
'"'
See, e.g., Richard Goldstone, Exposing Human Rights Abuses-A Help or
Hinderanceto Reconciliation?,22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q., 607, 609 (1995) (stating that
some Danes collaborated with the Nazis out of political conviction).
'37
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non-Germans who engaged in an armed struggle against the
Germans.142 This statement is valid even for such a classic home of
143
resistance activity as Norway.
True, there were hundreds of thousands of resisters in such
places as Yugoslavia, Poland, and the German-occupied part of the
Soviet Union, yet what is less often mentioned in history books is
that well over a million Soviet citizens served in the German armed
forces. 144 The only exception to the rule was Poland where there
were indeed very few collaborators.' 45 However, in Poland, in
addition to the country's historic tradition of brave resistance activity
and the population's utter dislike of the Germans, 146 there was also
the fact that the German authorities did not encourage
collaboration. 14 Rather, they preferred to treat all Polish citizens as

42

The Waffen-SS was the militarized combat formations of the SS (Schutzstaffel,

composed initially of the Verfligungstruppeand Totenkopfverbande (Death's Head units).
HELMUT KRAUSNICK & MARTIN BROSZAT, ANATOMY OF THE SS STATE 291 (Dorothy
Long & Marian Jackson trans., 1970). The Waffen-SS had little or no connection with
the camp guards and the extermination squads (Einsatzkommandos) (SD), though there
were some passing to and forth between all the branches of the SS. By 1945, there were
nearly 30 Waffen-SS divisions fighting in various battlefields and some of these
divisions, such as the SS Viking, the SS Nordland, and an Albanian division, were
recruited from foreign Nazis. CONSTANTINE FITZGIBBON, DENAZIFICATION 65 (1969).
Membership in the SS was generally considered guilt per se. NORMAN E. TUTOROW,
WAR CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS, AND WAR CRIMES TRIALS 500 (1986); see BRADLEY
F. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 158 (1977) (discussing the issue of
whether a majority of the armed SS units actually knew the "criminal purposes" of the
organization at the time they became members).
'41 See, e.g., GERALD REITLINGER, THE SS ALIBI OF A NATION 1922-1945, at
201
(1992) (stating that there were Norwegian volunteers in the Germania SS regiment);
HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 109, at 1513 (stating that although the
Norwegian government of Vidkin Quisling aligned with the Germans, it could not
prevent the emergence of Norwegian resistance).
'4
See REITLINGER supra note 127, at 201 (citing PETER KLEIST, ZWISCHEN HITLER
UND STALIN 205 (1950)).
145 But cf. id. at 126 ("In Poland there was collaboration from the very beginning in the
country itself.").
14 See HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 109, at 1146, 1149 (stating that he
Polish people felt "sheer hatred for their conquerors" and resistance to them was
widespread.).
14' But cf. REITLINGER, supra note 127, at 126-27 (stating that the SS made use of
certain sections of the Polish population against the Jews).
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slaves. 148
In order to give you an indication of the extent of wartime
collaboration, let me cite the case of Norway where both
collaboration and postwar retribution have been investigated
extensively. It has been estimated that ten percent of the Norwegians
voluntarily assisted the German occupiers; the proportion of active
resisters was much smaller.1 49 A collaborationist proportion of ten
percent might well be a realistic figure for the rest of Europe as well.
After the war in Norway, courts investigated 250,000 cases of
potential treason in a total population of two and one half million
persons; 92,000 individuals were actually tried by the50courts, 17,000
were sentenced to prison, and thirty were executed.1
Who were the main targets of the Norwegian measures?
Among others, each and every member of the Norwegian fascist
party, the Nasjonal Samling, as well as every Norwegian member of
the Waffen-SS. 15 In addition, all those were tried who had been
employed in German prisons and concentration camps as well as all
152
Red Cross nurses who had served in German military hospitals.
In the Netherlands, 150,000 persons were arrested after the

'
See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the PeculiarInstitution in American
Legal Development, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1009, 1033 n.26 (1993) ("In the 1940's
Germans enslaved their fellow countrymen (as well as Russians, Poles, and other
Europeans).").
'49 See, e.g., REITLINGER, supra note 127, at 155, 160 (stating that the Nordland and
Westland regiments, half of whose recruits were volunteers from Holland, Denmark,
Norway, and Finland, were added to the Germania SS regiment).
150 RICHARD PETROW, THE BITTER YEARS: THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF
DENMARK AND NORWAY APRIL 1940-MAY 1945, at 348-49 (1974) (stating that more
than 90,000 persons were arrested, investigated, or interrogated for wartime activities;
18,000 received prison sentences; and 30 Norwegian collaborators were sentenced to
death for wartime treason or atrocities). See generally MICHAEL BERENBAUM, THE
WORLD MUST KNOW; THE HISTORY OF THE HOLOCAUST AS TOLD IN THE UNITED
STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM 204 (1993) (noting that most collaborators
were tried and executed throughout Europe, including Norway's Prime Minister, Vidkin
Quisling).
5 See supra notes 126 and 133.
332 See SEYMOUR ROSSEL, THE HOLOCAUST 99 (1989) (arguing that "[tihose who

worked in the concentration and death camps, those who owned or ran the factories that
'rented' Jewish slaves .... [and] those who served as guards ... in the death camps"
all took part in the murder).
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In France, 126,000

individuals were confined in internment camps, 40,000 were sent to
prison, and about 800 were legally executed. 5 4 However, in a few
countries, such as Czechoslovakia and Romania, relatively few were
tried after the war. Today, the Romanian government still refuses to
recognize that there was extensive collaboration with the Germans
during World War II.155 Instead, the Romanian leadership acts as if
their country had always been opposed to Nazism. Never mind that

Romania contributed the largest armed force, after that of Germany,
to the campaign against the Soviet Union, and that Romania engaged
As for
in its own variety of the Holocaust during the war.
Czechoslovakia, retribution was primarily directed against the
German and Hungarian minorities who, besides the crimes committed
by their own members, were made collectively responsible for the
extensive collaborationist activity of Czechs and Slovaks. As a
result, after the war thousands of German civilians in Czechoslovakia
were murdered or executed without a trial, and the entire German56
community, nearly three million strong, was expelled to Germany. 1
Another great dilemma for the postwar leadership and courts
was whom they should actually punish. In Norway, as I have
mentioned, every member of the local fascist party was sent to
prison, even though membership in that small political party had been

'5 See, e.g., HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 109, at 1512 (stating that by the
end of the Second World War, 90,000 people were in detention and 109 people were
sentenced to death); Gibney, supra note 118, at 95 (stating that about 100,000 people in
Holland were imprisoned after the liberation and the number was reduced to 50,000 a
year later in October 1946).
's
See, e.g., Gibney, supra note 118, at 95-96 (stating that there were about 38,000
French political prisoners in January 1946).
"I See HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 109, at 1518 (stating that a delay in
punishing war criminals constituted part of a Romanian effort to conceal war crimes
committed by Romanian soldiers and citizens against Jews with Romanian citizenship).
'5 See, e.g., David Bar-Illan, The IsraelisAre Nazis'Equation,JERUSALEM POST, Aug.
4, 1995, at 11 (stating that three million Sudeten Germans were expelled from
Czechoslovakia following World War II and some ethnic Germans were either hanged
or shot because they allied themselves with Germany during the war). Today, Sudeten
Germans in Czechoslovakia still have no rights to the property they were forced to leave
behind. Id.
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perfectly legal before the war.1 17 Norwegian historians have
remarked that such individuals who had belonged to the Nasjonal
Samling before the German occupation, that is, people who may well
have joined out of personal conviction, received harsher sentences
after the war than those who had joined after 1940 for opportunistic
reasons.158
In Austria, Nazi criminals were rather seriously prosecuted in
the immediate postwar period with the courts imposing harsher
sentences on such defendants who had belonged to the illegal
Austrian Nazi movement before Austria was united with Germany in
1938,159 then on those who joined the NationalsozialistischeDeutsche
Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) 16 ° after the Anschlus. The trouble was,
however, that, according to Nazi documents, 100,000 persons
claimed, after 1938, to having been illegal Nazis when, in reality,
and again according to Nazi documents, there had been only 70,000
illegal members. 6 ' The other 30,000 were opportunists.' 62 Now
117 See PETROW, supra note 134, at 348 ("Thousands of
members of the Nasjonal
Samling party were seized, some whose only 'crime' had been party membership.").
The Norwegian Supreme Court held that Nazi "membership alone was grounds for
prosecution." Id. at 349. In the end, 46,000 Norwegians were convicted of war crimes.
Id.
"I8See PETROW, supra note 134, at 349 (stating that thousands of Norwegians were
imprisoned, fined, or deprived of their civil rights merely for having joined the Nasjonal
Samling Party while tens of thousands of others who willingly worked for the Germans
escaped prosecution). See generally HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 109, at
1066 (stating that Vidkun Quisling founded the fascist organization Nasjonal Samling in
May 1933).

159See FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, AUSTRIA: A COUNTRY STUDY

41-42 (Eric Solsten & David E. McClave eds., 2d ed. 1993) (stating that Austrian
Chancellor Engelberg Dollfuss outlawed the Nazi party as he wanted to see Austria
become the bulwark of Christian German culture against Nazism and communism);
BRUCE F. PAULEY, HITLER AND THE FORGOTTEN NAZI: A HISTORY OF AUSTRIAN
NATIONAL SOCIALISM 109 (1981) (stating that while the Austrian Nazi Party was illegal
in April 1934, about 50,000 illegal Nazis were convicted of various political and civil
offenses).
60 See generally HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 109, at 1033 (stating that the
German Workers Party, Deutsche Arberiterpartei, founded in 1919, changed its name
to NationalsozialistischeDeutsche Arbeiterpartei(NSDAP) and pursued German world
domination).
161PAULEY, supr a note 143, at 217 (stating that thirty percent of the Tyrolean
population joined the Nazi party for strictly opportunistic reasons and another ten to
twenty percent were occasional supporters).
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these persons were prosecuted for having falsely claimed a heroic
Nazi past.
Each country had its peculiar problems. In France, the
concept of "national honor" was taken very seriously and so was the
notion of protecting "national dignity."' 63 As a result, a great
number of women were punished for having had affairs with German
soldiers. Particularly severe was the punishment of such women who
had given birth to children of German soldiers. The French public
and the courts made it clear that French women had no right to their
own bodies.
The legal basis for all these procedures was both existing laws
and ex-post facto laws. In Norway, frequent references were made
to Sections 88 and 98 of the Norwegian Penal Code which defined
treason and revolutionary activity." 6 The question is still open,
162

See FED. RESEARCH DIv., supra note 143, at 53 (stating that the Austrian

government attempted to draw a distinction between those "committed Nazis and those
who had joined because of economic, social, or personal coercion").
163 See Binder, supra note 124, at 1342-43 (stating that the French conservative party
contended that the French Resistance was a national cause and that there were no traitors
in it).
'" Section 88 states:
Anybody who, in time of war, fails to fulfill a contract
relating to the supplies or the transport of the military forces or a
matter of importance to the military or civil defense, or is accessory
thereto, shall be punished by imprisonment up to ten years. If the
act has caused heavy damage to the defense of the country, or the
death or serious injury to body or health of another, a maximum of
life imprisonment may be imposed.
If the breach of contract results from negligence, the
perpetrator shall be punished by fine, or jailing or imprisonment up
to six months.
Anybody who commits such an act against a state allied
with Norway or at war with a common enemy, shall be similarly
punished.
THE NORWEGIAN PENAL CODE 47-48 (Gerhard 0. Mueller, ed., Harald Schjoldager &
Finn Backer trans., 1961). Section 98 states:
Anybody who attempts to bring about the alteration of
Norway's Constitution by illegal means, or is accessory thereto, shall
be punished by jailing or imprisonment for not less than five years.
If the act is committed by use of arms or by exploitation of the fear
of intervention by a foreign power, imprisonment for life may be
imposed.
Fines may be imposed in addition to confinement.
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however, whether Norway was actively at war with Germany
following the surrender of the Norwegian army to the German
invaders on June

10,

1940.165

If the country had actually

surrendered, then the Hague Convention of 1907 which encouraged
collaboration -- within limits -- with the occupation authorities would

have applied.' 66 Yet the Norwegian courts decided that because the
king and the government were in London during the war, 167 Norway
had never quit the war and the surrender of the army had only local
As a consequence, all those who
and temporary validity.
collaborated with the Germans were betraying a country engaged in
war.
In the so-called satellite countries, it was difficult to decide
upon which basis to judge the accused collaborators since these
countries had been legally allied to Germany. In Hungary, where,
among other people, four former prime ministers were executed, it
was doubtful whether these legally appointed prime ministers had
committed a crime by allying their country to Germany. Prime
Minister Ldszl6 Bdrdossy, who declared war on the Soviet Union in
June 1941, was sentenced to death and executed in68 1946, precisely
because he had declared war on the Soviet Union. 1
An additional difficulty was that, during the war, almost every
occupied country experienced a form of civil war; what the French

Id. at 52.
supra note 109, at 1066 (stating that the two
underground resistance organizations, the XU (the military intelligence organization) and
the Milorg (the underground army), formed the Hjemmefrontens Ledelse (Home Front
Command) in 1944 to fight the Germans); see The World at War: 1939-1945 from
Normandy to Paris, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 5, 1994, at E2 (stating that Norway
signed the armistice agreement with Germany on June 9, 1940). See generally PETROW,
supra note 134, at 99-117 (stating that the King of Norway and the Norwegian
government-in-exile in London refused to acknowledge Nazi rule or to submit to its
orders).
11 But cf. Convention Respecting Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV),
Annex, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 45, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539, 1 Bevans 631 (stating that "[it]
is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the
hostile [power]").
167 HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 109, at 1066.
161 HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA,

'6 See id. at 1511 (stating that Liszl6 B~rdossy, premier of Hungary was hanged on
January 10, 1946).
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historians call "La Guerre Franco-Fran~aise.
",69 In many cases, the
civil war amounted to much more than a simple conflict between
collaborators and resisters. Instead, there was a many-sided struggle.
In Poland, where the main resistance force, the so-called Home
Army, 7 ' which recognized the exiled government in London,
engaged in bloody conflict with the People's Army7 1 which obeyed
orders emanating from Moscow, and with the nationalist resistance
movement which recognized neither London nor Moscow. In
addition, there were terrible conflicts in Poland with Ukrainian,
Jewish, and Soviet partisans.172 Yet all these resistance groups also

169 The term refers to the violent civil war situation in 1944 between French Fascist

collaborators and their old political enemies which they tried to get rid of during the
German occupation. COLLABORATION IN FRANCE: POLITICS AND CULTURE DURING THE
NAZI OCCUPATION, 1940-1944, at 11 (Gerhard Hirschfeld & Patrick Marsh eds., 1989)
[hereinafter COLLABORATION]. The term is also generally used to refer to the political
division of a nation. See, e.g., Nick Spicer, Behind the 'Franco-French Wars',
MONTREAL GAZETTE, Dec. 17, 1995, at D9 (noting that some referred to France's
internal political conflict since 1789 as the endless Franco-French Wars); Rone Tempest,
'Franco-French War' over Treaty Leaves Scars, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1992, at 4
(describing the divisions within France on the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty for
the European Union as a Franco-French War).
17o The Armia Krajowa, or Home Army, was the underground military organization in
Poland from the fall of 1939 until its disbanding in January 1945. HOLOCAUST
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 109, at 88-89. Early in the army's formation, the Londonbased Polish-Government-in-Exile seized control of the Home Army. Id. In 1944, the
Home Army was responsible for the Warsaw Polish Uprising, carrying out thousands
of armed raids and intelligence operations, bombing hundreds of railway shipments, and
participating in many battles with the German police. Id.
...In January 1944, the Polish National Council created the Armia Ludowa (People's
Army), formerly known as the Gwardia Ludowa (People's Guard), an organization
founded by Communists. Id. at 633. By the summer of 1944, the People's Army had
34,000 members. Id. Between January 1944 and January 1945, those forces engaged
in more than 1500 military actions, half of which were against German transport and
communications. Id. In July 1944, the People's Army merged with the Polish army
formed in the Soviet Union. Id.
172 Id. at 783 (describing Hirsch Kaplinski as the founder and commander of the Jewish
partisan battalion known as the "Kaplinski Battalion"). The Battalion consisted of 120
men who punished Nazi collaborators and fought the German militia. Id. On December
10, 1942, during the German attack on Lipiczany Forest, Russian partisans ambushed
and killed Kaplinski. Id. The Ukranian Insurgent Army, Ukeainska PovstanskaArmyia
(UPA), the military arm of the Organization of Ukraian Nationalists, fought mostly
against the Soviet partisan movement throughout 1943. Id. at 1531. During the
Carpathian Mountains Campaign against the Soviet movement, the UPA units murdered
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fought the Germans.

173

In Yugoslavia, Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and Bosnian
Muslims fought each other, as did the Royalists and the Communists,
the Italian, Bulgarian,
all the while being allied to or fighting against
174
Hungarian, and German occupation forces.
There was also the question of what to do with the multitudes
of people who, as the fortunes of war changed, had switched from
collaboration to resistance. In France, 48,486 persons were judged
by the courts as having been unworthy of national honor; as a
consequence, they were condemned to degradation nationale or
national degradation. 175 Yet about twenty percent of these sorry
characters were immediately rehabilitated by the same courts for
having been not only dastardly collaborators but also brave resisters.
In fact, a very large number of people, probably more than twenty
percent, changed their minds and attitudes as the war progressed.' 76

Jews who had taken refuge in the forests and villages. Id.
173Id. at 1531-32 (stating that in the second half of 1944 the UPA began to attack the
German army, "seizing equipment and capturing soldiers in the rear of German combat
units"). Yeheskel Atlas, a physician and Jewish partisan commander in 1942 "initiated
an attack on Derechin in which 44 German policemen were captured and executed." Id.
During the Ruda-Jaworska battle of October 10, 1942, Atlas' company participated in
killing 127 Germans, capturing 75 more, and seizing a considerable amount of war
material. Id. at 106.
174 See David M. Kresock, "Ethnic Cleansing" in the Balkans: The Legal Foundations
of Foreign Intervention, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203, 218 (1994) (stating that "the
Croats viewed the Nazis as liberators who displaced the oppressive Serbians-dominated
leadership of Yugoslavia"); Roger Thurow & Tony Horwitz, Serbs Maintain Their Fight
Is Righting Old Wrongs, ASIAN WALL STREET J., Sept. 22, 1992, at 11 (stating that the
Muslims joined the Croats who had allied with the Nazis in World War H to fight the
Serbs).
15 See Henry Rousso, L 'tpuration: Die Politische Sduberung in Frankreich, in
POLITISCHE

SAUBERUNG

IN

EUROPA:

DIE

ABRECHNUNG

MIT FASCHISMUS

UND

217 (Klaus-Dietmar Henke & Hans
Woller eds., 1991) [hereinafter POLITISCHE SAUBERUNG IN EUROPA]; Leila S. Wexler,
The Interpretationof the Nuremberg Principles by the French Courtof Cassation:From
Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 380 n. 111 (1994)
(explaining the various penalties of convicted war criminals, including degradation
nationale, which deprived them of certain civil rights).
176 General Blumentritt of the Wehrmacht stated that,
[in] 1943 . . .difficulties were increased because the Resistance
movement in France had by then become very formidable, and was
causing many casualties, as well as serious strain. It had not
KOLLABORATION NACH DEM ZWEITEN WELTKIEG
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Consider the French Communist Party which in 1939 and 1940, when
Germany was an ally of the Soviet Union, did its best to sabotage the
war effort, and whose leaders, following the defeat of France, offered
their services to the Germans! 177 Yet, after the German attack on the
Soviet Union in June 1941, the same party engaged in the most
heroic struggle against the Nazi occupiers. 7 '

In some cases, as in that of the Serbian Royalist Chetniks or
the Ukrainian nationalist Bandera group, it is impossible to say
whether they were collaborators or resisters. 179 These groups often
fought the Germans but just as often sided with the Nazis in the
struggle against the Communists or their neighbors. 80
There was also the question facing the courts. as to how to
cope with the consequences of the wild purges, which had started
well before liberation. In France, for example, it has been reliably
estimated that about 11,000 people were executed between 1944 and
1946 for collaboration and war crimes.'
Of them, about 10,000
were put to death before liberation by the resistance, and only about

amounted to much in 1942. It was then divided into three distinct
groups-Communists, Gaullists and Giraudists. Fortunately for us,
these three groups were mutually antagonistic, and often brought us
information about one another's activities. But from 1943 onwards
they became united with Britain directing their operations ....
B. LIDDELL HART, THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL 386 (1948).
'7

See, e.g., ALFRED COBBAN, A HISTORY OF MODERN FRANCE: THE FALL OF THE

REPUBLIC 168-69 (George Braziller 1965) (1957).
171 See, e.g., Stanley Meisler, French Controversy Flaresover Role of Communist Party
in Resistance, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1985, at 5.
"I See generally HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 109, at 288-89 (noting how
the Chetniks' position towards Germany and Communism changed); id. at 145-46
(reporting how Bandera and his Ukrainian nationalist organization originally assisted the
Nazis but later opposed the German government).
180 Id.
"I1 See, e.g., Mitterrand's Departure May Close Painful Vichy Chapter, Reuter
European Community Report, Apr. 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
ALLWLD File (noting that "about 11,000 collaborators were executed at, or after, the
Liberation, many without trials or with only the most summary of proceedings"); cf.
Wexler, supra note 159, at 316 n.114 (stating that some estimate the number of
Frenchmen executed at the hands of other Frenchmen to be as high as 40,000).
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1000 were later executed by the order of regularly constituted
courts."2 A similar situation prevailed in Italy where 15,000 people
were killed by the resistance as fascists and collaborators, mostly
following a summary trial.' 83 This was also the fate of Benito
Mussolini and his mistress. 18 4 However, only a few hundred Italians
were put to death as a result, of regular court proceedings.
How were the People's Courts constituted and how did they
function? Usually, they contained one or more professional judges
but often the professionals had no right to vote on the fate of the
defendant, the latter being reserved for the lay judges delegated by
the anti-fascist political parties. Today, such a practice would strike
us as absolutely impermissible; yet it is clear that no other solution
was conceivable at that time.
When one reads the minutes of some of these trials, it
becomes clear that such proceedings would be unacceptable today.
Often, there was a circus atmosphere with audience participation.
The judges lectured the defendants; the defense did not always do its
duty. Yet these were no show trials either. The defendants were
made familiar with the charges; they could prepare their defense, and
often they were able to choose their lawyers. In Hungary, under
Soviet occupation, former Prime Minister Liszl6 Bdrdossy was
allowed to make spirited speeches in court that humiliated the inept
prosecution. 111
Unfortunately, the courts were more interested in prosecuting
crimes against the resistance movement than in crimes against the
Jews -- that is -- what the Nuremberg International Court defined as

crimes against humanity.

182

Often, crimes against Jews were not

See, e.g., COLLABORATION, supra note 153, at 241 (estimating that about 9000

collaborators were summarily executed during the first few days of liberation); Paul
Abrahams, Bitter Memories of the Resistance FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995, at 1
(describing how many suspected fascists were executed by the resistance without trial);
Ronald Koven, National Memory: The Duty To Remember, the Need To Forget, SOC'Y,
Sept. 1995, at 52 (stating that "thousands of suspected collaborators were publicly
disgraced or executed by the Resistance at the Liberation, often without even the benefit
of a kangaroo court").
"83Hans Woller, 'Ausgebliebene Sduberung'? Die Abrechnung mit dem Fraschismusin
Italien, in POLITISCHE SAUBERUNG IN EUROPA, supra note 159, at 183.
See WERNER MASTER, NUREMBERG: A NATION ON TRIAL 287 (1977).
11 See supra note 152.
184
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mentioned at all; a prime case of this was in France where Jewish
deportees to Auschwitz were put in the same category as deported
resisters. I6 Yet maybe ninety percent of those deported from France
to German concentration camps had not been resisters but Jews
forced into the trains by the French authorities. 8 7 As a consequence,
such police commanders who were guilty of deporting the Jews, but
who at the last minute had managed to change to the side of the
resistance, were acquitted after the war or were not even tried.
Additionally, there was the question of timing. The earlier
tribunals acted far more sternly than the later tribunals. Although in
some countries, such as the Netherlands, the trials continued for
several years, the punishment meted out in the late 1940's was far
less severe than sentences pronounced back in 1945.188 In the late
1940's, this process of transformation ended in the show trials of
leading Communist war-time resisters, such as Party General
Secretary Rudolf Slansky in Czechoslovakia and Minister of Interior
Liszl6 Endre in Hungary, as well as many others."8 9
Overall, this was the first time that Europe faced the problem
of political crimes committed by large groups of people. There were
many great discrepancies in the handling of the matter. Many
innocent people were punished and many guilty individuals went
unpunished. Still, a large number of the guilty received their just
deserts. How all this affected the population is very hard to say.

'86 HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA,

supra note 109, at 512 (stating that over 70,000 French

Jews were deported to Auschwitz).
"87See id. at 511 (stating that since the massive deportation in January 1943, the French
police were no longer as reliable as they had been in assembling and despatching the
Jews by railway from Drancy to Auschwitz).
188 Id. at 1512 ("A total of 14,562 persons were convicted and sentenced in the
Netherlands, the punishment pronounced by the courts decreasing in severity as time
elapsed and the impact of liberation declined.").
I9 Lszl6 Endre (1895-1946), Undersecretary of State in Dome Sztojay's Ministry of
Interior, was tried for the persecution of Hungarian Jews and was hanged as a war
criminal on March 29, 1946. HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 109, at 445. The
1952 show trial of Rudolf Slansky, former General Secretary of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party, marked the beginning of the anti-Jewish purge in Prague. Id. at
1406. See generally Istvan Deak, Report on the Murder of the GeneralSecretary, NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 20, 1990, at 36 (reviewing KAREL KAPLAN, REPORT ON THE MURDER
OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY (Karel Kovanda trans., 1990)) (discussing the show trials
of Rudolf Slansky).
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Certainly, there were those who argued that too few had been
punished. There were also those who complained that the purge
trials had been a parody of justice. It seems to me, however, that
Europeans generally accepted these procedures as a necessary
catharsis. Among other things, it lifted the guilty feelings of the
many millions who were never tried for having failed the test of true
patriotism and humanity during the frightful years of German
occupation.
PROFESSOR CHEN: Thank you very much, Professor Deak, for
giving us a very comprehensive picture about the post-war experience
concerning accountability in Western and Eastern Europe.
Professor Paul Hoffman
PROFESSOR CHEN: We will continue to explore national
experiences, but now let us shift our focus to another continent.
For this, our next speaker is Professor Paul Hoffman.
Professor Hoffman is currently in private practice. His law firm
concentrates in constitutional, civil rights, and international human
rights litigation. Before establishing his law firm in 1994, he had
served for ten years as the legal director of the American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California. Prior to his legal
directorship, he was a professor at Southwestern University School
of Law in Los Angeles, and has since kept up his academic interest
as an adjunct professor. He has written numerous articles for various
publications.
Professor Hoffman will speak about the way in which the new
Ethiopian government has used principles in its effort to bring former
officials of the Mengistu regime to justice for crimes against
humanity and human rights violations. 1" Professor Hoffman.
PROFESSOR PAUL HOFFMAN: Thank you, Professor Chen, and

11 See generally

TOM J. FARER, WAR CLOUDS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA:

THE

STORM 60, 63 (1991) (defining the Mengistu regime as the dictatorship of
Mengistu Haile Meriam who overthrew and murdered Haile Selassie and was Chief in
the Ethiopian Dergue from 1977 to 1991).
WIDENING
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thank you for the invitation to be here. It is an honor to be here with
my distinguished colleagues. I think I have revised my remarks to
accommodate Louis Henkin's comments by now. Hopefully, I will
be responsive to them.
As the world's attention has focused on the International War
Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the recently expanded
jurisdiction to Rwanda, there has been another significant
development in Ethiopia within the same time frame that I think has
not gotten very much attention at all, at least not in the press in the
United States, and that is human rights trials. One of the issues is
whether to call the Ethiopian trials "war crime trials," "crimes
against humanity trials," or "human rights trials." The trials apply
Ethiopian law and international law. 19'
These developments were inspired by Nuremberg, probably
more by Nuremberg's assembly than by Nuremberg's law. By this,
I mean the idea of bringing individuals, who had committed crimes
of atrocities during the Mengistu regime, to accountability under both
international law and domestic Ethiopian law, and the understanding
that the new government in Ethiopia had a duty to investigate and
punish people who were responsible for those crimes.
I would like to describe what is happening in Ethiopia and
some of the issues that have been raised in the context of the
Ethiopian trials based on a mission that I took for the Human Rights
'9 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544,
82 U.N.T.S. 279. Article Six of the Nuremburg Charter defines three categories of
crimes within the Tribunal's jurisdiction:
a) Crimes Against Peace: Namely, the planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of a . . . war of aggression, or a war in
violation of international . . . treaties... ;
b) Conventional War Crimes: Namely, violations of the law of
customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not limited to,
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory . . . killing
of hostages .. .;
c) Crimes Against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population . ...
Id.; Louis HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 1-3 (1978) (defining human rights as
a term that includes those moral-political claims which, by contemporary consensus,
every human being has or is deemed to have upon his society or government and claims
which are recognized as of right, not by love, grace, nor charity).
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Watch Africa. A report was prepared at the end of last year about
the status of those trials to that point.192 I would also like to try to
give at least some preliminary answers to those questions about the
comparison between national and international institutions. I make
these comments and give you these descriptions at a time when it is
very much in doubt whether the Ethiopian human rights trials will be
a very big success, an abject failure, or something in between,
because it is still early in the process. There are reasons to be very
optimistic and reasons to be very pessimistic about the Ethiopian
trials.
First, just a few quick words about the landscape of human
rights violations, the violations of the laws against war, 193 and the
laws of war in Ethiopia. 194
For those of you not familiar with what happened in Ethiopia
in the period roughly between 1974 and 1991-the period after the

192 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1995, at 21
(1994) (stating that a report on accountability was due to be published by the Human
Rights Watch at the end of 1994).
193 See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, L.N.T.S. 343 (stating that a violation of the laws against war
occurs when the laws articulated in the Hague Regulations are violated); see, e.g.,
Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2351, U.N.T.S. 542; Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the
Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 118 L.N.T.S.
303; Convention for the Adaption to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva
Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371, U.N.T.S. 543; Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded on the Field of Battle (Red Cross
Convention), Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 29 I.L.M. 391; Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343;
Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57; Convention
Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, U.N.T.S. 538;
Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, U.N.T.S. 540, Convention with Respect
to the Laws and Customs of War by Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 98 U.N.T.S.
93; Declaration of Brussels, Mar. 19, 1874, United States-Belgium, 18 Stat. 804, 4
Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser.2) 219.
'9
See Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia, Proc. No. 158 of 1957, art. 281,
reprintedin Stuart H. Deming, War Crimes and International CriminalLaw, 28 AKRON
L. REV. 421, 424 (1995) at 428 n. 17; see also African Charter on Human and People's
Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59
(stating that the drafters' objective was to prepare an African Charter on human rights
that was based on African legal philosophy and was responsive to African needs).
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overthrow of Haile Selassie' 95-and certainly after the consolidation
of power in Colonel Mengistu in 1975 and 1976, as many as 500,000
people died. These deaths occurred in the context of what could be
characterized as human rights violations, and in the context of
violations against civilian populations in at least internal armed
conflict, and possibly international conflict. A human rights watcher
prepared a book a few years ago detailing these violations in great
96
length. 1
In particular, one set of violations is a paragon to what went
on during the Mengistu regime. It was a period of time in Ethiopia
called the Red Terror, which occurred between 1977 and 1979 in
Ethiopia, mainly between the fall of 1977 and the spring of 1978.'
In that period, it is estimated that as many as 100,000 people were
summarily executed or just simply disappeared. 98 There was
systematic torture of those people who were later killed as well as of
those who survived.1 99
There was widespread detention without charge or trial.2"

,9 See generally Edward Ullendorf, Paying Tribute to Haile Selassie, THE TIMES
(London), July 23, 1992, (reporting that Haile Selassie was the Emperor of Ethiopia
from 1930 until his overthrow in 1974 by Colonel Mengistu); Charles A. Radin,
Revisiting Ethiopia'sDemigod, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 1992, at 2 (reporting that Haile
Selassie was overthrown and apparently executed by Mengistu Haile Mariam, a Russiantrained communist-militarist, and was found buried beneath Mengistu's office fifteen
years later).
196 Alex De Waal, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia, AFRICA
WATCH REPORT (1991).
,9 See generally FARER, supra note 178 (discussing the Red Terror).
'g Red Terror Relived, ECONOMIST (Addis Ababa), July 30, 1994, at 37 (reporting
between 40,000 and 100,000 people killed in Ethiopia).
99 See, e.g., Ethiopians Eager To Close Horrifying Chapter in History, OTTAWA
CITIZEN, Nov. 12, 1994, at H10 (hereinafter Horrifying Chapter) (stating that 1300
people face 20-year-old charges for torture and killings); Christopher W. Haffke, The
Torture Victim Protection Act: More Symbol Than Substance, 43 EMORY L.J. 1468
(1994) (reporting a story about three women living in Ethiopia in the 1970's and their
tortuous experiences with the Mengistu regime, ultimately bringing the official that
tortured them to court in the United States to face charges of human rights violations and
torture).
200 See, e.g., Ethiopia Human Rights Practices, 1994, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH,
Mar. 1995 (stating that as recently as 1994, the Ethiopian government continued to arrest
and detain individuals without charging them with a crime).
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court

system.20

People were killed, detained, or otherwise dealt with, at the whim of
the officials in charge. It was not that much of a whim, however,
because there were committees making decisions about who would
live and who would die. There would be a committee established in

a local community, in Addis Ababa, and officials would decide each
night who should be taken out and who would disappear.2"'

During one particular period of the Red Terror, hundreds of
bodies turned up in the morning with Red Terror signs on them.
People searched the streets for their loved ones, for their parents, and
for their children.20 3 In fact, the vast majority of the victims of the
Mengistu regime were teenagers, kids as young as sixteen, although

some were older.20 4 This was the Mengistu regime's all-out war
against any form of opposition to its political control.
Most of the violations were based on political motivations,
although there was a strong ethnic component to many of the
violations, particularly when the regime came under attack from
national liberation armies which were mainly Tigreans from the
2016
north.20 5 There was also an Oromo liberation front from the south.
And so the regime, when it ultimately fell, was overthrown by a
coalition of groups, and some of the responses to that were possibly
An example of a crime that took place in
ethnically-based.
connection with the internal conflict occurred in June 1988, when a

201John W. Van Doren, Positivism and the Rule of Law, Formal Systems or Concealed

Values: A Case Study of the EthiopianLegal System, 3 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 165,
189 (1994) (analyzing articles on legal positivism and concluding that Ethiopia does not
meet the criteria of a country that has an operable legal system).
202 See generally Jennifer Parmelee, Leaders ofEthiopia's '70s Dictatorship Go on Trial
for Murder, WASH. POST., Dec. 14, 1994, at A32 (discussing the regular broadcasting
by the state of the names of the people executed by the government).
203 Horrifying Chapter,supra note 187, at H 10 (stating that children of a former colonel
in Haile Selassie's army were taken from their homes, killed, and left in the streets by
Red Terror armies).
2I4 Id. (stating that six children, ages 12 to 18, were dragged out of their homes at night
by 10 armed soldiers and were found dead in the morgue two days later).
205 See James C. Paul, Human Rights and the Structure of Security Forces in
ConstitutionalOrders: The Case of Ethiopia, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 235, 238
n.13 (1994).
206 Id.
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market in Tigre was attacked by the Ethiopian Air Force.2"7
Helicopters prevented the men, women, and children at the market
from escaping, and about 1800 of them were killed that day.2" 8
There are many other examples where hundreds of people were
killed.20 9
There are also allegations that denial of food aid was used to
starve the population or to create famine.210 People were forcibly
relocated from the north to the south, arguably to remove them from
famine areas, but they were relocated in such a way that at least
100,000 of the 600,000 people relocated died.21 Sometimes, they
died from being crushed together in the plane.212 Others were taken
to places where malaria and other diseases were rampant, and were
left to die without any provisions for their safety. 2" 3 This was the
kind of thing with which the government was dealing.
In May of 1991, when the National Liberation Army took
over and marched into Addis Ababa, they captured approximately
2000 people from the former regime and put them in prison. 1 4 Many
of the leaders escaped; perhaps several hundred.21 5 Mengistu himself
now lives in Zimbabwe.2 16

207Horrifying Chapter,supra note 187, at H10 (stating that the market town of Hausien

in Tigre Province was bombed on June 22, 1988, killing 1800 civilians).
208

Id.

209 Id.

De Waal, supra note 184, at A15 (stating that food was withheld from Eritrea and
Tigre by Amhara leaders in Ethiopia).
211 See, e.g., Yonas Deressa, RebelAid; Ethiopia, NAT'L REV., Apr. 24, 1987, at 36
(1987).
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 See Horrifying Chapter, supra note 187, at H10 (stating that 1300 leaders of the
210

Mengistu regime are awaiting trial for crimes against humanity in Ethiopian prisons
under the rule of the new government).
25 See id. (stating that the Special Prosecutor's Office set up by the new Ethiopian
government in 1991 has implicated over 3500 other Red Terror leaders who fled
Ethiopia when Colonel Mengistu was overthrown).
216 Id. (stating that Mengistu, who now lives in Zimbabwe, and 21 others, were tried
in absentia on December 13, 1994); Lewis Machipisa & Gumisai Mutume, EthiopiaZimbabwe: Ethiopia Demands Return of Mengistu, INTERPRESS GLOBAL INFO.
NETWORK, Nov. 11, 1993, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS database,
INTERPS File, 1993 WL 2533174 (stating that pressure is being put on the Zimbabwe
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The new regime came into possession of hundreds of
thousands of documents. Included in these documents were orders,
some of which included meticulous notes about the people who were
to be killed, while others were orders between high-level officials of
the military regime and local officials that actually carried out many
of the atrocities.27 From the beginning, the transitional government
of Ethiopia accepted a duty to investigate and punish offenders based
on international law, citing Nuremberg and other precedents.218 In
order to be effective, Ethiopia created a special prosecutor's office in
August of 1992.21 9 The office had a budget of $250,000 and a
handful of prosecutors to start working with the 309,000 pages of
documents and tens of thousands of witnesses and atrocities.22°
This was clearly a large-scale endeavor for a war crimes or
human rights tribunal. 22' And so, from the beginning, this process
has been plagued by some very practical problems, including poverty.
Ethiopia is a poverty stricken country. It has no resources 222 and
$250,000 is not very much money with which to start a war crimes
tribunal. Many of the experienced lawyers were affiliated, or at least
believed to be affiliated, with the past regime. A whole new legal
and court system had to be created. Thus, there was nation building
and democracy building, each of which had to be created at every

government to extradite Mengistu Haile Mariam to face charges of genocide).
237 See Horrifying Chapter, supra note 187, at H10.
238 See Machipisa & Mutume, supra note 204 (stating that the transitional government
is undertaking the legal process to press charges against Mengistu Haile Mariam and the
other leaders of his regime).
219 Deming, supra note 182, at 424 (stating that the transitional government of Ethiopia
created the Special Prosecutor's Office for the investigation and prosecution of the
members of the "Dergue" regime and charged members with human rights violations).
2 Horrifying Chapter, supra note 187, at H10 (stating that the government spent two
years in preparation for trials against Red Terror officials and compiled 309,215 pages
of written documents).
223 See Jennifer Parmelee, Ethiopia Ready To Try Officials Who Carried Out 'Red
Terror,' WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1994, at A33 (stating that the Ethiopian war crimes
tribunal will be the most extensive scrutiny given to human rights violations since
Nuremburg).
122 See, e.g., A World Briefing/Africa RegionalBriefing, WASH. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 1996,
at A14 (describing Ethiopia, with a per capita income of less than $100 per year, as one
of the poorest countries in Africa).
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level.223 There was also a question, which still remains, about what
law would apply to these crimes. Because of the lack of resources,
many people remained in detention.22 4 In fact, many now remain in
detention without charge or trial since May, 1991.225 The first
charges in this process were not brought until October, 1994-a full
two and one-half years after the takeover, and more than two years
after the special prosecutor's office was established.22 6
In October of 1994, the special prosecutor's office issued
charges based on genocide, crimes against humanity, and a variety of
ordinary criminal offenses under the Ethiopian penal code, including
aggravated murder, and other crimes against seventy-three
defendants, 227 only forty-five of whom were still in the country. 2 '
Colonel Mengistu was to be tried in absentia2 9 for approximately
1800 identified killings, about 200 disappearances, and a number of
instances of torture.230
The proceedings started in December of 1994, with the

223

See generally Situation in South Africa, Prepared Statement of John F. Hicks,

AssistantAdministrator, Bureaufor Africa, U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment,
Before the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U. S. House of
Representatives,July 27, 1994, availablein WESTLAW, FEDNSWASH database, 1994
WL 11134999 [hereinafter Hicks's Statement] (addressing the United States' role in
Ethiopia's transition to democracy).
224 See Deming, supra note 182, at 426 (stating that Ethiopia, a country having only
1000 formally-trained lawyers, has compiled a staff of 40 lawyers with no more than two
vehicles to bring as many as 2000 people to trial, thus making it a very difficult task).
225 Ethiopia War Crimes Trials Start Tuesday, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 12, 1994, at A8
(hereinafter War Crimes) (noting that "1700 suspects are in prison waiting to be
charged").
226 See Horifying Chapter, supra note 187, at H1O (stating that Mengistu will be among
the first group of 66 people to go on trial starting December 13, 1994, almost three
years after the creation of the Special Prosecutor's Office).
227 See, e.g, Angela Mackay, Ethiopia's 'Nuremberg' Big Step in the Healing Process,
OTTAWA CITIZEN,

Feb. 18, 1995, at B3 (discussing the charges leveled against 73

former Dergue members which list 269 acts of genocide).
22 See, e.g., John Balzar, On the Paper Trail of Ethoipia Genocide, GUARDIAN, Dec.
14, 1994, at 015.
229 Id.
230 See Trial Delayed for Two Months for Former Ethiopian Ruler, SEATTLE TIMES,
Mar. 16, 1995, at A9 [hereinafter TrialDelayed] (reporting that 47 members of the 120member "Dergue" that ruled Ethiopia for 17 years were accused of killing 1823
identified victims, including Emperor Haile Selassie in 1975).
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reading of the indictment, which has not been translated into English,
making it very difficult to know exactly what it contains.231 Then the
proceedings were adjourned until March to give the defense lawyers
an opportunity to raise objections.232 Objections were raised a few
weeks ago, 2" and unfortunately, the transcript has not been
translated, so I am not sure what has been objected to. But it seems
like the core issues regarding the scope of international law in the
proceedings have yet to be squarely framed. After the objections
were made, the court adjourned for another two months to give the
prosecutor a chance to respond to the charges.234 Now, the purpose
of that chronology was to show that even though this process has
been going on since 1991, or at least since August of 1992, the first
charges have yet to be brought.
There are still 1300 people in detention that have not yet been
charged or tried, and it is not clear when they are going to be
charged. 235 The special prosecutor said that they would be charged
within six months of October, 1994, but no one really believed that
the charges would be brought that year.236 The rainy season will start
in July, therefore the trials are unlikely to start after the May
proceedings. And so, it is not clear what will happen at these
proceedings.
I will now discuss some of the issues that have come up. One
issue that has plagued the special prosecutor's office that I think is
important in this context, is what law to apply. There are several
dimensions to this question. First, is it appropriate to try all these
people purely for domestic crimes, such as murder? The easiest

23 See Parmelee, supra note 190, at A32 (stating that it took over four hours to read

the indictments which included the names of 1907 victims).
232 Ethiopian War Crimes Trial Off Until March, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 1994, at 10.
233 See Trial Delayed, supra note 218, at A9.
234

Id.

235 See Balzar, supra note 216, at 015 (reporting that 1300 men were in custody); cf.

Terry Leonard, Ethiopia To Begin Vast War Crimes Trials, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 12,
1994, at 10 (citing a Red Cross report that about 1700 suspects are being held in prison
waiting to be charged).
236 See Leonard, supra note 223, at 10 (stating that up to 3000 "military underlings and
civilian henchmen" would be charged); Situation in Ethiopia, FED. DOCUMENT
CLEARING HousE, July 27, 1994, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS database,
CONGTMY File, 1994 WL 14190851.
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thing to do would be to try many of the people involved in these
crimes with murder and other domestic crimes. However, the feeling
in the special prosecutor's office, regarding international donors that
have contributed to the process, was that to try these people purely
on domestic crimes would not match the gravity of the offenses
involved in this case. Thus, it is important to use international
crimes and international standards in.the prosecutions.
Ethiopian law, specifically the 1957 Ethiopian Penal Code,237
is another legacy of Nuremberg and post-Nuremberg developments.
The Code was very much influenced by Nuremberg, by the Genocide
Convention, and by the Geneva Convention of 1949.238 Based upon

a variety of provisions incorporating international and convention
law, the special prosecutor has abdicated international customary law
by incorporating it within Ethiopian law.23 9 To date, there has not
been a prosecution under the provisions of the 1957 Ethiopian Penal
Code.
The most pertinent provision of the Penal Code regarding
genocide and crimes against humanity is Article 281 .240 That
provision reads:
Whosoever with intent to destroy in whole or in part
a national, ethnic, racial, religious, or political group,
organizes, orders, or engages in, be it at time of war
or in time of peace, killings, bodily harm or serious
injuries to the physical or mental health of members
of the group in any way whatsoever . . . [and that

there is a] compulsory movement to the dispersion of
people and children or their placing under living
conditions calculated to result in their death or

237

See generally STEVEN

LOWENSTEIN, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF THE PENAL

LAW OF ETHIOPIA (1965) (discussing the formation of the 1957 Penal Code of Ethiopia).
23 See Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia, Proc. No. 158 of 1957, arts. 281-282,

reprinted in Deming, supra note 182, at 428 n.17.
239 See Deming, supra note 178, at 425 (stating that since international provisions are
incorporated into the Ethiopian Penal Code, there is no need to apply customary
international law to overcome evidentiary problems).
11 See Saba Seyoum, Detailsfrom Press Conference, Background, Agence Fr.-Presse,
Oct. 27, 1994, availablein WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS database, AGFRP File, 1994
WL 9629951 (stating that a total of 1200 officials were charged under Article 281).
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241

I think what is important to note about Article 281 is that, for
one thing, it escapes the limitation in the Genocide Convention2 42 of
not including political groups. Rather, political groups are included
in Article 281 and, as I mentioned before, many of the attacks are
against people because of their actual or perceived political beliefs.24 3
In addition, Article 281 says that its provisions apply whether these
acts took place in times of war or in times of peace.2 44
The application of Article 281 offers the promise, at least
under the Ethiopian penal code, of the issuance of some very broad
proclamations about what Ethiopian law means, and if the special
prosecutor gets his way, about what customary international law may
mean with respect to the kinds of mass killings and systematic
killings that occurred during the Red Terror, which were unrelated
to internal armed conflict and certainly unrelated to any international
conflict.
And, as I have mentioned, there are no rulings on the scope
of Article 281 or the relationship between the Ethiopian Penal Code
and customary international law in the interpretation and application
of Article 281, or any of the other articles. It seems like Article 281
is the one relied upon most heavily by the special prosecutor's
office. 245 There are a number of additional issues that will arise as
the relationship between Ethiopian law and international customary
law is developed-for example, the scope of the superior orders
defense and the scope of command responsibility. It appears in the
Ethiopian Penal Code that the scope of command responsibility may
be narrower than the international principles discussed by previous

241 Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia, Proc. No. 158 of 1957, art. 281, reprinted

in Deming, supra note 182, at 428 n.17.
242 See supra note 105.
243 See, e.g., Alan Zarembo, In Ethiopia, Time To Settle Accounts, S.F. CHRON., Apr.
29, 1995, at Al (describing a campaign to exterminate Mengistu's political enemies).
244 Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia, Proc. No. 158 of 1957, art. 281, reprinted
in Deming, supra note 182, at 428 n.17.
245 See Seyoum, supra note 228 (stating that 1200 officials were charged under Article
281).
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246
speakers.24
So, one of the questions is: Does the Ethiopian Penal Code
have that limitation when it comes to the kinds of international crimes
that are embodied in Article 281, to the extent that international
crimes are, in fact, embodied in Article 281, or whether Article 281
is fixed in time, as the statute reads? Those are issues that I am sure
will be raised, along with the underlying principles of legality. Will
the Ethiopian courts interpret the Penal Code as incorporating
customary law as it has evolved, or as it did evolve, to the time when
these events occurred? That is the special prosecutor's position, and
it is not clear what the defendants will raise. But it has been a big
issue in terms of what to charge and has been lurking over the whole

proceeding.247

Since I am running out of time, let me address briefly at least
some of the questions about whether national or international
tribunals are the best places to try the related issues. On the positive
side of using national tribunals, it is possible in Ethiopia that the
Central High Court, which is the trial court, and the Ethiopian
Supreme Court will decide whether to apply international customary
law, which has been incorporated within the Ethiopian Penal Code,
to a wide variety of acts, and make pronouncements that may be a
model for national tribunals and other developing countries that have
emerged from long periods of repression. So, there is a potential in
this national mechanism to serve as a better and a more accurate
model than the one in Nuremberg.
There is a positive domestic element as well. These criminal
proceedings could be used to build a nation and a legal system that
respects the rule of law, which is the central problem in Ethiopian
society. Indeed, Ethiopia has never really had a legal system that
respects the rule of law when it comes to human rights, and so these
trials can be a beacon to Ethiopian society which is ridden with ethnic
conflict. It is possible that the society could come together, since all

See Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia, Proc. No. 158 of 1957, art. 282,
reprinted in Deming, supra note 182, at 428 n.17.
247 See, e.g., Zarembo, supra note 231, at Al (stating that lawyers for the accused are
24

also accusing the government of human rights abuses for "jailing 1300 former officials
with charges for more than three years" and prohibiting the lawyers from exchanging
notes with their clients).
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ethnic groups really were targeted by the Mengistu regime at one
point or another. And so, it can inspire those kind of developments
in Ethiopia.
Now I will focus on the negatives, or at least the potential
negatives. One is, as Professor Henkin mentioned, will this be the
victor's justice, or will it be retribution without the rule of law?
There are some troubling signs. The fact that people have been held
for four years without charge or trial is certainly a troubling omen.2"'
It is not clear if criminal defendants' rights will be fully respected in
this process. There are some signs even now that attorneys and
clients cannot have confidential communications in preparing to meet
these charges.
Ethiopia has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.2 49 However, it does not appear to have taken any
steps to incorporate the due process rules of the covenant into these
proceedings or into its court system generally, or at least the jury is
still out on that question. Another problem is that it may take years
to try 3000 people. At this rate, it actually could take longer. I
mean, the death sentence will probably not be charged for fifty years,
with the accused being kept in Shebele prison without charge or trial.
Obviously, if the process takes years and ultimately results in a
decision where everybody in Ethiopian society will say, "You should
have just shot them, like they shot Haile Selassie in the first two
months after the regime," then that is not a good model.
Further, the international community needs to be supportive
of processes like the ones that are going on in Ethiopia. I think there
is a total of $4 million that has poured into Ethiopia from western
donors, including 25the
United States, for necessities like computers
0
and support staff.
If the international community has a stake, which I think it
does, in processes like these proceedings, particularly in the absence

248

See War Crimes, supra note 213, at A8.

249 See Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to Which the United States Is A Party, 32

I.L.M. 1690 (1993) (documenting that Ethiopia acceded to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights on June 11, 1993).
1 See Hicks' Statement, supra note 211 (discussing the millions of dollars of aid to
Ethiopia and the difficult process of bringing charges efficiently within international
standards due to lack of staff and overwhelming paperwork).
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of effective international tribunals, the international community
should at least provide the resources that it takes to bring this kind of

justice to fruition, particularly for a country like Ethiopia, which
clearly can not afford it. So, if we want justice as an international

community, we have an obligation to make it work.

Mr. Neil Kritz
PROFESSOR CHEN: Thank you very much, Professor Hoffman, for
giving us a vivid comparison between national and international
institutions in the case of Ethiopia.
Our next speaker is Neil Kritz. Mr. Kritz is Director of the
Rule of Law Initiative at the United States Institute of Peace which
is engaged in a broad range of projects to advance peace through the
construction of democratic, legal, and governmental systems. At lE
request of the Department of Defense, he constructed an 800-page
curriculum on international law and the promotion of democracy by
training United States and foreign military officers. Mr. Kritz has
been involved in the Helsinki process since 1979,"' has been on staff

of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) and has served as Chairman of an American Bar
Association subcommittee under the Helsinki process. He is the

author of The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in
5I

The Helsinki Process, or Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

(CSCE), is an ongoing multilateral forum consisting of 51 nation states, including the
United States, Canada, European countries, and the former Soviet Republics. With the
1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act, these countries have politically, but not legally,
committed themselves to conduct regular discussions on issues varying from economic
development to humanitarian concerns. These commitments are categorized into three
baskets. The first basket pertains to security issues and the behavior to which the
participating states have agreed to commit themselves. The second basket includes
economic cooperation and encouraging science and technology. The third basket focuses
on human rights. Fact Sheets: CSCE, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH 813, Dec. 12,
At the meetings, the states consider ways for members to fulfill their
1994.
commitments and examine the "commitments by the signatory states, survey the results
of inter-sessional and other meetings . . . strengthen and refine CSCE's institutions and
procedures, and set the future course for the CSCE process." Id. See generally
WILLIAM KOREY, THE PROMISES WE KEEP: HUMAN RIGHTS, THE HELSINKI PROCESS,

AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1993) (explaining and analyzing the Helsinki Process
from its inception).
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the New Era. He is also editor of a three volume, 2200-page
collection of articles and documents concerning emerging democracies
and repressive regimes, which will be published later this year.
Mr. Kritz will talk about the war crimes tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, and also the prospects for
establishing an international criminal court. Mr. Kritz.
MR. NEIL KRITZ: Thank you very much. Before I begin my
remarks I would like to make two initial ones. First, I am obliged to
mention that these remarks are mine and do not necessarily represent
the views of the United States Institute of Peace. Number two, I
would like to add my voice to the chorus of those before me in
stating how honored I am in being able to participate in this tribute
to Telford Taylor. What most of us spend our time doing day-to-day
in our jobs we do primarily as a result of the effectiveness of your
efforts fifty years ago and we have you to thank for what we are able
to do today.
A half century after Nuremberg, there is clearly a move in the
direction of internationalization in the approach to the establishment
of truth and justice, particularly where circumstances prevent the
fulfillment of this task by national institutions. This is true not only
with respect to the prosecution of egregious abuses of human rights,
but also the closely related task of establishing the facts of the case.
In situations like El Salvador, where it was clear that society was
simply too polarized to engage in the process of a commission of
inquiry, such as is taking place elsewhere in the southern cone, to
establish the facts of the abuses that had taken place in previous
years, it was recognized that once again internationalization was
necessary. This has obviously become one of the more prominent
examples in recent times. The United Nations' Truth Commission
for El Salvador was established to examine and report on the abuses
that had taken place.252
252

In 1992, the United Nations established a three-member Truth Commission to

explore violations of human rights during El Salvador's decade-long civil war. Michael
H. Posner, The Evolution of Human Rights Law, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449,
451-52 (1994). While the Truth Commission did not have the authority to prosecute
human rights violators, it has produced an extensive report, documenting some of the
most notorious crimes and identifies those officials it believes to be responsible. Id. See
generally Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador,
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This will be the case, once again, in Guatemala as part of the
negotiated package-hopefully, to resolve the long-standing civil war
in that country.253 I would argue that this is simply the way to go
where circumstances do not permit the use of national institutions.
I will have more to say on this later.
But I would argue that the cases of Argentina, Chile, and the
process now underway in South Africa-with the creation of a similar
truth commission-should serve multiple causes. Not only the cause
of justice, but of national reconciliation, of a better catharsis for
society than going outside the country to an international institution
to do what society ideally should be able to do for itself. This leads
to the question of when and how to effectively steer this movement
toward internationalization. The source of greater enthusiasm for
many in this field today is, of course, the international criminal
tribunal in the former Yugoslavia, which is viewed as a major step
forward in this process. I am afraid I am here to sound a somewhat
discordant note in the symphony. I would suggest that one of the
lessons that may emerge from the Yugoslavia tribunal is that victors'
justice is not all bad. It has its place. Nuremberg was able to move
forward because the war was over and things were sorted out
sufficiently to engage in the process of investigation and prosecution.
The attempt to use this kind of mechanism in the words of the
statute and resolution establishing the Yugoslavia tribunal, for the
very purpose of trying to resolve the conflict-a hot ongoing
conflict-simply may be an abuse of what could otherwise be a useful
mechanism. Under the terms of the statute, there will be no trials in
absentia."' What this means in practical terms is that taking custody,
27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 497 (1994) (discussing the formation of the Commission,
its investigative function, and its works).
253 See Key Developments in Guatemala's Civil War, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 27, 1995 at
A7 (stating that the government and the rebels finally signed a human rights accord
calling for a 230-member United Nations rights verification team which was
unprecedented in a country still at war); Marcos Breton, Remnants of an Empire,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 17, 1995, at 2.
254 United Nations: Secretary General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia,
Art. 21, Annex, U.N, Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) reprintedin 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1185;
Andrew Kelly, Curtain to Rise on Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, Reuters World
Serv., availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, WORLD File (noting that the tribunal cannot
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or retaining custody of most of the worst perpetrators of these
crimes, will require some form of police action by the international
community. The international community has made it abundantly
clear over the years of this war that it will not take such police
action.2 5 The obvious conclusion before we ever get to the point of

a tribunal is that, if the international community was prepared to take
police action to move in and achieve justice in Bosnia, the
international community should take that police action to stop the
war. This is something that the international community is not
prepared to do. 256 Ambassador Albright dismissed this concern at a
State Department conference that I participated in and attended
yesterday, by noting that the tribunal can request Security Council
action for non-enforcement of its request for arrests, detention, and
extradition.257 In the event these requests are not fulfilled, the
defendants will become international pariahs. 258 As a result, the

conduct trials in absentia but that under a recent amendment, the prosecutor can present
evidence and witnesses to testify without the suspects' presence).
211See, e.g., John-Thor Dahlburg, U.N. Probers Vow to Identify Rwandan Killers,
Hous. CHRON., Sept. 4, 1994, at 31 (discussing how U.N. efforts to identify the Balkan
war criminals place doubts on how efficiently the U.N. will handle the Rawandan
situation); Norman Kempster, Ex-Envoy to Yugoslavia Leaving State Department, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 1994, at 7 (stating that a career diplomat left the State Department
because of his frustration with the international effort to act affirmatively to stop war in
Bosnia); Withdrawing U.N. Troops Won 'tAvert Bosnian Tragedy, DENV. POST, July 14,
1995, at B10 (quoting House Speaker Newt Gingrich's characterization of the
international community's efforts in Bosnia as "the worst performance by democracies
since the later 1930's").
256 See, e.g., Robert Mauthner, Allied Policy Divisions Widen, FIN. TIMES, May 19,
1993, at 3 (noting that Washington's reason for calling off meetings to discuss the
Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia was that Washington "was not ready to discuss joint
steps by the international community in Bosnia because of differences over what action
should be taken"); John Pomfret, U.N. Waffling in Bosnia Helps Serbs; Penchantfor
Negotiating Creates Problems Instead of Solutions, WASH. POST, May 8, 1994, at A23
(stating that the international community has been unable to agree on what action should
be taken to the end the war).
257 See, e.g., James Morrison, Embassy Row, WASH.TIMES, Apr. 14, 1994, at A12
(quoting Madeleine Albright, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, as saying
that "[the] tribunal is empowered to request the Security Council to take enforcement
action against any government that fails to [hand over persons indicted]").
258 See, e.g., Madeleine K. Albright, We Won't Let War Criminals Walk; With or
Without a Balkan Peace Deal, the U.S. Won't Relent, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1995, at
C1; Robert J. White, Balkans War Brings Gain (Really)for Human Rights, STAR-TRIB.
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leaders of this genocide will not be able to leave their country without
being subject to arrest. I would suggest, for those who already have
megalo-maniacal tendencies, and think that they can take on such
conduct, the thought that they can live comfortably within their own
country, and are convinced they will rule, may not think of this as
much of a punishment.
The tribunal has so far been able to issue indictments because
of the realities of political pressures. I suggest that this tribunal will
inevitably be tied up with the political realities of the moment and, as
many have suggested, with the desire to negotiate an end to the
conflict. Notwithstanding the best efforts of many people, negotiating
an end to the conflict will probably mean the same as it has meant in
other countries, including Bosnia and some countries in the southern
cone. This includes a negotiation of impunity and a negotiation that
the leaders will not be prosecuted if they allow an end to the conflict.
This leaves a disparity with the "small fries" being the only ones who
can be brought to justice.
Despite the outstanding and praiseworthy work of Mr.
Blewitt, Judge Goldstone, and others, one is reminded of the
inappropriate and untenable position into which our own courts are
placed all too frequently. When Congress has a nettlesome issue to
resolve and simply can not bite the bullet and do it, it writes
legislation that leaves the tough issues unanswered and says, well, the
courts will figure this out. It is an inappropriate use of our courts
and I would suggest it is an inappropriate use of international courts.
As a consequence, it may be something of a disservice in the
movement to create positive law and preclude credibility for the
ultimate establishment of an international criminal tribunal.
The credibility of this ad hoc tribunal may be bolstered
somewhat by the merger of the Rwandan case into the tribunal. As
you know, the structures of the two tribunals share many of their
facilities and much of their staff, and I would suggest that Rwanda
NEWSPAPER OF THE TWIN CITIES, Apr. 28, 1994, at 33A; The Tribunal and Peace,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 20, 1995 at 20; Remarks by Madeleine Albright U.S.

Ambassador to the United Nations at the State Department Conference on Crises, Fed.
News Serv., availablein WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS database, FEDNSWASH File,
1995 WL 6622828, Apr. 3, 1995; 60 Minutes: An Exercise in Hypocrisy; Focus of the
United Nations More on Peacekeeping than War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia, (CBS
television broadcast, Sept. 10, 1995).
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presents the most interesting case currently through which to examine
the question of this panel, namely, the issue of international tribunals
versus national tribunals in addressing these abuses. The debate for
each has had various points made by several before me. That is the
problem with coming at the end of these sorts of sessions.
I would note that the United Nations' Commission of
Experts, 59 which was appointed to study the question of the existence
of crimes in the Rwandan case, and which led to the resolution
establishing the tribunal, strenuously argued in its report that
prosecutions would be better undertaken by an international rather
than a municipal tribunal.2 6 ° The Commission also warned that the
convictions from Rwandan courts would not be received as justice,
" '
but as simple retribution.26
There are hosts of reasons for
259 On July 1, 1994, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 established,

inter alia, an impartial Commission of Experts "with a view to providing the SecretaryGeneral with its conclusions on the evidence of grave violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including the evidence of
possible acts of genocide." United Nations: Security Council Resolution 955 (1994)
Establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
year, 3453d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). Resolution 955 also called upon
humanitarian organizations to provide "any substantiated information of grave violations
of international law committed in Rwanda during the conflict to the Commission of
Experts." Id. The Security Council also established a similar Commission to investigate
violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
Id.
260 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, War-Crime Tribunal:The Time is Now, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 11, 1993, at 29; U.N. Panel Recommends Trials For Rwandan War Criminals,
Seattle Times, Oct. 4, 1994 (reporting that the United Nations Commission of Experts
claimed enough evidence to try Rwandan war criminals in an international court).
6I See, e.g., David Beresford, Focus/South Africa's Search for Truth: Spy Scandal
Fuels CallsforPurge, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 13, 1996 (arguing that genocide trials
in Rwanda are intended for retribution); Inigo Gilmore, Regime of Terror Keeps
Rwandans in Cholera Camps, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 4, 1994 (reporting that the
Rwandan President Bizimungu stated that "about 32,000 former government officials had
been implicated in the genocide and those found guilty by the international tribunal
would face death, but "[t]he ousted party [feared] that talk of justice could easily be
translated into the language of retribution."); Victoria Graham, PresidentSays Tribunal
Should Be In Rwanda, Calls For Arrests Overseas, Associated Press, Oct. 6, 1994,
available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS database, ASSOCPR File, 1994 WL
10102669 (reporting that Rwanda's President Pasteur Bizimungu feels that the war
crimes tribunal should take place in Rwanda as opposed to Geneva); Farhan Haq,
Rwanda: Government Scorns U.N. ProposalFor Outside Trials, Inter Press Serv., Oct.
4,1994, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS database, INTERPS File, 1994 WL
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recommending an international approach. An international tribunal
is better positioned to convey a clear message that the international
community simply will not tolerate such atrocities preventing further
2 62
carnage in Rwanda and, hopefully, now in Burundi.
An international tribunal can be staffed by experts in
interpreting international law standards in a fast moving and
confusing field. It could more likely have the necessary human and
material resources at its disposal, which as Professor Hoffman so
eloquently suggested, is a problem for the Ethiopian prosecutor's
office today. It can be functioning and be perceived as functioning
on the basis of independence and impartiality rather than retribution.
It can advance the development and enforcement of international
criminal norms and can have a much greater chance than the
Rwandan courts of obtaining jurisdiction over the majority of senior
officials who are no longer in the country.
On the other hand, the prosecution before domestic courts
could enhance the legitimacy of the new government, could
strengthen its judiciary, and could be more sensitive to nuances of
local communities. Furthermore, it could emphasize that Rwandan
society itself would henceforth hold individuals accountable for their
crimes and stress a local alternative to vigilante justice-which in the
aftermath of genocide has, of course, been a problem. I would
suggest, however, that the debate is and was a somewhat specious
one. Precious weeks and months in the Rwandan case were lost
while academics and diplomats debated whether it would be better to

2589465 (reporting that Claude Dusaidi, director-general of Rwanda's Foreign Ministry,
believes all Rwanda war crimes should be tried in Rwanda because of the accessibility
of evidence and witnesses, and because the imposed penalty will be death whereas if the
crimes are tried in the Netherlands there would only be "European standards of justice"
which would mean no death sentences); Security Council Agrees on Setting Up
International Tribunal on Rwanda, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 5, 1994, available
in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS database, AGFRP File, 1994 WL 9653391 (reporting
that the Security Council recommended that those responsible for deliberate acts of
genocide against Rwanda's Tutsi tribe, as described in a report by a United Nations
Commission of Experts, will be tried by an international tribunal).
262 See generally Update on Developments in Rwanda and Burundi, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE DISPATCH, Apr. 17, 1995, at 332.
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go the international or national route.263 The reality of the situation
is that both are necessary for a variety of reasons.
Timing is such that the Rwandan trials cannot start
immediately. The international community needs to make some
statements with respect to accountability quickly. The reality is that
when all is said and done, not more than one percent of potential
defendants will ever be brought before the international tribunal,
leaving as many as 100,000 cases either ignored or dealt with in
some fashion by Rwandan society itself."6 With that said, there is
a need for coordination and it is for some of these reasons that this
presents such an interesting case in looking at the problem of using
a national or international tribunal.
First is the issue of sorting out the numbers in the cases, such
as which case will come before which body. As with Nuremberg,
what will likely and what should probably occur ideally is that the
most senior officials, the smaller number of people, will come before
the international tribunal. It would be useful in this context and it is
useful to remember some of the statistics from Nuremberg-the
model that we are looking at in establishing these tribunals;
authorities there faced the same question of which cases and how
many to pursue.
At their peak in 1947, the Nuremberg proceedings required
the services of nearly 900 Allied employees. 6 5 Even with such a
large scale and costly operation, such that it will not be matched in
any of the contemporary cases, the Nuremberg trials ultimately
involved the prosecution of some 200 defendants grouped into cases
lasting over a four-year period. 6 6
In the case of the Rwandan tribunal, they also can be

263

See, e.g., Melissa Gordon, Justice on Trial: The Efficacy of the International

Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, 1 INT'L L. STUDENT ASS'N J. INT'L & COMP. L. 217,

228 (1995).
264 See, e.g., id. at 230.
265 See, e.g., JOHN MENDELSOHN, TRIAL BY DOCUMENT: THE USE OF SEIZED RECORDS

IN THE UNITED STATES PROCEEDINGS AT NURNBERG 87 (1988) (stating that by the

beginning of 1948 there were about 1500 staff personnel in the Nuremberg war crime
agencies, about 700 were United States and Allied civilians).
266 See, e.g., Carl Haensel, The Nuremburg Trials Revisited, 13 DEPAUL L. REV. 248,
255 (1964) (stating that "199 men [were] accused before the International Military
Tribunal and the American Military Tribunal in Nuremberg during 1945 to 1949").
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classified as well into separate tiers of responsibility. The first tier
is a tightly organized group of 100 to 300 persons who are the key
players in designing and developing a conscious policy and campaign
of genocide. 67 In a second tier, there are estimated to be 1000 to
3000 individuals: local leaders who are not part of the central
network but were able to personally order local killings, including
those of municipal officials and the administrative authorities.2 68 And
in the third tier are at least 30,000 people according to the Rwandan
government-and by some estimate, as many as 100,000
individuals- who participated in the process of killing.269
The Rwandan case, it should be remembered, is different
from many of those cases that we have been talking about earlier
today. In many cases of mass human rights abuse and genocide it
was a conscious attempt by the government to isolate the crimes and
the criminals, to carry out the abuses by a carefully orchestrated,
well-organized and controlled military and political network, and to
allow the vast majority of society to go about its business untainted,
if it was willing to ignore what was going on in its midst.
In the Rwandan case, the opposite was attempted. The
attempt was made consciously to involve as many people, within the
society, in the killing as possible. I would note that the case that
Professor Hoffman discussed, the Ethiopian case, has made the
attempt to similarly categorize these levels of accountability in order
to somehow sort through these numbers.
A particularly contentious issue in the Rwandan case and, as
I will mention shortly with respect to a permanent international
criminal court, is a question of location. Again, going back to the
United Nations Commission of Experts, it concluded in its September
report:

267 See, e.g., Genocide Trials Will Have Juries, Plea Bargains, AGENCE FRANCE-

PRESSE, Feb. 17, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WORLD File (stating that
those who planned the genocide are in the first category).
26I See, e.g., id. (stating that those who organized the genocide are in the second
category).
269 See, e.g., Aidan Hartley, Death and Disease Rampant in Packed Rwanda Jail,
Reuters, Apr. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File (stating that
30,000 people were imprisoned for crimes of genocide in official prisons and probably
many more were held in detention centers and army barracks).
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[F]or purposes of independence, subjectivity and
impartiality, there are advantages in having trials
conducted by an international criminal tribunal in a
place such as the Hague for the very reason that there
is a substantial distance between the venue of the trial
and the places where severest atrocities have been
perpetrated.270

Fortunately, that is a conclusion that was not adopted by the Security
Council and now, as the tribunal is moving forward, by those making
it work more effective.
The tribunal will serve an important function in developing
international norms of criminal law. It is also true, though, that in
this case, as in many others, the very process of prosecution needs
to convey an important and visible message to victims and
perpetrators alike that atrocities are being addressed within the
framework of the rule of law. The very public display of the trials
is vital.
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg took place
in Germany not simply as a matter of convenience, but because that
is where it could have its greatest impact. The crucial example of an
international tribunal having the ability to do that which national
institutions cannot relates to the indictment of obtaining custody of
the worse perpetrators; in the Rwandan case they are outside the
country. The Rwandan courts will have no access to them.
Long-term continuation of this problem will result in a threat to the
stability of the new Rwandan government.
The international tribunal has the ability to have an impact,

270

Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts Established in

Accordance with Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), Commission of Experts on
Rwanda, 49th Sess., Annex to the Letter, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994). See generally
The World Tries Again, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 1995, at 21.
[A]n international tribunal finds out the facts and impartially pins the
blame on the individuals responsible, not vaguely on whole nations.
No long-lasting reconciliation between enemies, after all, can come
about without a proper accounting for war crimes; peace is built
upon truth. Such a process re-establishes confidence in the rule of
law. It should also deter future killers.
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not only by pursuing those cases of people within Rwanda but, in
addition, by obtaining custody, hopefully, of those leaders of the
genocide who are now in Zaire. Additionally, under the charter,
their territorial jurisdiction extends to neighboring states with respect
to serious violations committed by Rwandan citizens. 7' There is a
problem, however, in terms of timing, and I will try to wrap this up
quickly. The Rwandan tribunal and the prosecutor's office are
obliged by the statute to establish a prima facie case before any order
for detention can be issued. 72 Unlike many domestic systems, the
international criminal court draft statute, I think, moves this process
forward in a positive direction. Provisional arrests under a proposed
international court can proceed to indictment, if there is probable
cause and the suspect most likely will not be available. Timing again
is a crucial problem. Mr. Wolfe stated this morning that justice
delayed is justice weakened. Well, unfortunately, in this case, justice
has not proven swift. This week marks the one year anniversary of
the beginning of the genocide in Rwanda, and I fear that rather than
serving its deterrent effect most quickly, we may instead, be facing
the prospect of having Burundi-not calmed by the prosecution
process that establishes accountability-added to the jurisdiction of the
tribunal.
Finally, many of these issues manifest themselves in the
debate over establishing a permanent international criminal court. In
the period following Nuremberg, there was some expectation of rapid
action to build upon the process with creation of such a court. The
question of national versus international tribunals-the relationship of
the location of proceedings and the domestic impact-remains a very
real issue. The draft statute also leaves open the possibility of the
tribunal conducting its hearings on location, as is the case with the
Yugoslavian and Rwandan tribunals, even though the seat may be
elsewhere. The tribunal and the international criminal court can, in
fact, hold the proceedings on-site, making a greater impact within the

271

United Nations: Security Council Resolution,

955 (1994)

Establishing the

International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, 3453d mtg.
at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1605 (1994).
272 Id. art. 18, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 at 1609 (stating that if the prosecutor makes
out a prima facie case, the trial judge shall confirm the indictment and at the
prosecutor's request issue orders of detention).
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local community.2 73

The international criminal court may lose the element,
however-as is true of these other international tribunals-of national
acknowledgment of the crimes that have taken place.
The
internalization of that acknowledgment is vital in changing a culture
to avoid future atrocities. It is easier if outsiders come in and say it
for you than having to say it for yourself. As a consequence of the
debate that has been mentioned by several before me, the draft statute
for the international criminal court comes down squarely in favor of
national tribunals, and states that the court is intended to be
complimentary to national criminal justice. It is in these systems
where such trying procedures may not be available or may be
2 74
ineffective.
We need to strengthen national tribunals, national courts,
judiciaries, prosecuting systems, and police forces in order to ensure
that they can, hopefully, prevent these problems and take care of
them when they do occur. An international criminal court would
hopefully avoid-or at least reduce-the problem of timing. It would
not be necessary to go through the lengthy political debates that have
delayed action by ad hoc tribunals in Yugoslavia and in Rwanda,
because a permanent court would already be established. It would
arguably be more independent and less constrained by the politics of
the moment. It would likely have more budgetary freedom. A
number of concerns remaining are real and legitimate. It is not a
panacea, because we cannot completely escape the issue of victor's
justice.
The proposed international criminal court that's now moving
forward through the United Nations system will not have jurisdiction
over state-sponsored human rights abuses while guilty governments
remain in power; it may not obtain jurisdiction even after successor
democracies assume office. Jurisdiction will only be possible when
the custodial state and the state in which those abuses occurred
consent.
It is quite conceivable that, even when there is a succession,

273

id.

274

Id.
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such as Pinochet in Chile made quite clear,2 75 if the hair on the head
of a single one of his soldiers is touched by the new government, he
will make sure that 1973 seems like child's play and the abuses will
recur. 276 In that situation, it is not clear whether the new government
will have the power to consent to the jurisdiction of an international
tribunal.
With that said, beginning yesterday, an ad hoc committee
started a two-week meeting at the United Nations to look in detail at
the remaining issues concerning the establishment of these courts.277
If need be, it will resume again in August. It is moving forward. A
sixty-article statute exists, and if not fully fulfilling the promise of
Nuremberg, we are clearly taking major steps in the right direction.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR CHEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Kritz, for breaking
much new ground and for having a strong belief in an international
criminal court.

Questions
In order to give equal time to every panelist, we can only take two
or three quick questions. Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I would quickly like to address Professor
Goldman. I think most of you have spoken very eloquently about the
need for an international tribunal and I think Mr. Kritz answered this
question a little and in a way it is basic and in a way it is moot.

Calvin Sims, Villian or Hero? Pinochet Is Still Viewed as Both in Chile, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994, at 4 (stating that thousands of dissenters were killed by General
Augusto Pinochet's security forces in his 17-year reign and that although he is no longer
in power, he remains a popular and potent figure in Chile).
276 See, e.g., Edward C. Snyder, The Dirty Legal War: Human Rights and the Rule of
Law in Chile 1973-1995, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 253, 287 (1995).
27 See, e.g., Thalif Deen, United Nations: U.N. Split Over International Criminal
Court,Inter Press Serv., Dec. 22, 1994, availablein WESTLAW, ALLNEWS database,
1994 WL 3223677 (stating that an ad hoc committee will be set up by the 185-member
General Assembly to discuss administrative requirements for the proposed international
criminal court and will have its first meeting by August 1995).
275
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But, on a very practical level, what kind of power would the
international tribunal have? Would it apply only to signatory nations,
and if not, how would you reconcile this with questions of national
and cultural self-determination?
PROFESSOR GOLDMAN: I think the next panel will deal with that.
I think Professor Cherif Bassiouni is more than qualified. He's
talked about these issues more than most in the world-certainly
much more than I.
MR. KRITZ: I would mention briefly that whether it is formally part
of the United Nations system and automatically binding on all parties,
it is one of the issues under debate with respect to how the
international criminal court is established, whether it is formally part
of the United Nation system and automatically binding on all parties.
That is actually part of the debate which relates to the nature of how
the international court is established, whether it is part of the United
Nation system and incumbent on all bodies, or whether it is a treatybased system in which each state will make its own decisions. But
Bob is correct, Professor Bassiouni is really the person to answer
your question most properly.
PROFESSOR PAUST: I would like to make one point that might
have been missed. Every state has the competence to prosecute
international crimes under customary international law. 278 There is
universal jurisdiction, and the nationality of the perpetrator does not
matter, nor does the place of the perpetration; this is an ongoing
international, national responsibility.
There have been failures, of course. But even with a new
international criminal tribunal or several international criminal
tribunals, we are thinking about several international criminal
tribunals in the Americas in the next five to ten years. But even with
international criminal tribunals, clearly, most international criminals
will have to be prosecuted in national tribunals. There are just too

278 See, e.g., Howard S. Levie, The Statute of the InternationalTribunalfor the Former

Yugoslavia: A Comparison with the Past and a Look at the Future, 21 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & CoM. 1, 14 (1995) ("There is no question but that national courts have
jurisdiction to try their own nationals for violations . . . of international law.").
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many accused out there.
PROFESSOR CHEN: Sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I hope that the practice of the
Washington-based office of the special investigations-specifically its
failure to prosecute, and in effect grant immunity to those individuals
who have reached old age, who fear they will not survive
denaturalization, deportation, or their advanced age and ill
health-will not be a practice of the war crime commission.
Secondly, as Professor Henkin mentioned, it is true that
Article Four of the Genocide Convention provides for prosecutions
of those individuals whose activities are condemned by Article Four
of the Genocide Convention. There is, however, a significant*
problem that has been overlooked. I call to your attention that the
High Contracting Parties of the Genocide Convention have engaged
in what can most charitably be described as rhetorical gymnastics on
the question of the applicability of the crime of genocide to the
current conflict, because of one verb in Article One; that is, the verb
"prevent." They are not willing to fulfill the obligation legally
mandated under international law to prevent genocide. In addition,
there are 110 High Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention
aside from that of Bosnia.279 I ask the panelists to be blunt, be frank.
What high contracting parties to the Genocide Convention have acted
consistently with their legally mandated obligation to be preventive,
and to cooperate?
The second aspect that is most accentuated, especially to
Madeleine Albright, is that the prosecution, which has been consistent
with the prevention clause, has been inconsistent with the punishment
clause. Who has not provided? Who has obstructed? Again, I do
not look for diplomacy, be blunt and be frank.
And lastly, United States immigration law does not proscribe
the admission of those who have committed war crimes in the former
Yugoslavia, in Rwanda, or any other country consistent with the

279

Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, at 97-98, U.N. Doc.

ST/LEG/SER.E80 (1990).
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Holtzman Amendment, 8 ° which precludes by definition, the
admission of anyone who has committed war crimes during World
War II. I call to your attention the fact that these people are free to
come and go with or without Secretary of State Warren Christopher's
permission, such as in the case of Dr. Karadzic."' I would like the
panelists to be blunt, be frank, and don't hold back.
MR. KRITZ: I will briefly answer only part of that. I apologize if
that is not satisfactory.
The terms of the tribunal actually require all states to do
whatever they need to amend their domestic legislation to comply
with the requests and orders of the tribunal. It is an issue that is now
actually being looked at very seriously within the State and Justice
departments, and on the Hill. This will ensure that, for example,
corrections can be made to the Genocide Convention to implement
legislation, as it was adopted a few years ago, to ensure that those
who are here, who are sought by the tribunal can, in fact, be
extradited from this country.
PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: Let me just add a footnote. The United
States legislation that I had referred to earlier has what I call a Nazi
exemption clause.282 The jurisdiction under the United States statute
is limited to genocide that occurs in the United States or at the hands
of the United States national perpetrator.283 Clearly, most genocidal
acts do not occur within the United States and at the hands of United
States perpetrators, so our legislation is quite inadequate and
presumably purposely inadequate.

28 See generally John F. Stephens, The Denaturalizationand Extradition of Ivan the

Terrible, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 821, 832-37 (1995) (discussing the 1978 enactment of the
Holtzman Amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act).
2"'
See, e.g., Barry Schweid, Mediator's Complaint on Bosnia Rebuffed by
Administration, Associated Press, Feb. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ARCNEWS File.
282 United States: Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, reprinted in 28
I.L.M. 754, 759 (May 1989) (adopted and codified by the United States as 18 U.S.C.
§ 1091(d) (1994) ("(d) REQUIRED CIRCUMSTANCES FOR OFFENSES - The
circumstances referred to in subsections (a) and (c) is that - (1) the offense is committed
in the United States; or (2) the alleged offender is a national of the United States").
283 Id.
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PROFESSOR CHEN: I have been instructed by our organizer that we
have only time for one more question. For the others, please reserve
your questions for the next panel. My apologies. Sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is regarding a pretty big
concern of mine and of a lot of people. It is the issue of violence
against women, and I am interested in how the tribunal will discuss
this issue. I was wondering, as legal scholars and historians, if you
would have some comments on how the tribunal should go about
handling this issue.
One topic that has been discussed lately has been the issue of
genocidal rape, the handling and implications of rape as a form of
genocide. Do any of you have any comments about this?
PROFESSOR GOLDMAN: Just very briefly. It seems pretty clear
that the problems of classifying this as being only an internationalized
civil war is that you have to break up the component parts, then have
to face the issue of whether or not the grave breach provisions that
would apply to a noninternational armed conflict, as inter-Bosnia and
violence, or whatever, are obviated by the fact that it was treated as
if it were interstate international in nature.
It is unequivocal. It is the view that the International
Committee of the Red Cross 284 has prepared memoranda or a protocol
stating that rape will be treated, in and of itself, as a grave breach.285
That is what you need. Those are the magic words in entailing the
individual penal responsibilities.
Now, there are nuances to it that I am not as familiar with.
I think it is going to take the prosecutors and those who investigate,
just like in every single situation, to see those who order the issue
take responsibility for using the individual random act; the sexual act
of rape in a sense versus when it is ordered as part of the setting up
24 See generally SUNGA, supra note 84, at 53 ("The International Committee of the Red

Cross (ICRC) was founded as a neutral and independent organization to develop and
implement norms of international humanitarian law.").
285 See, e.g., Theodore Meron, Comment, Rape as a Crime under International
Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 424, 426 & n.20 (1993). The ICRC Aide
Memoire of Dec. 3, 1992, declared that the grave breach of willfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health, and Article 147 of the 4th Geneva
Convention, cover rape. Id.
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camps for purposes of impregnating, cleansing, and so forth. But
insofar as us detailing criminal responsibility under humanitarian law,

that is without question.
PROFESSOR DEAK: Since you mentioned the historian, in the
national court, rape was not treated separately from other acts of
violence.2 86
What aggravated the question in Eastern Europe was that if
one can talk about genocidal rape, it was certainly not committed by
the Axis Powers but by the Soviets. 287 Ilya Ehrenburg 288 and others
asked for it, told the soldiers to engage in it in order to punish and
humiliate the German women and German nation. Consequently,
there was a great dilemma for all of the illegitimate children who
were born as a result of the systematic rape by Soviet soldiers.2 189 It
is true that Stalin subsequently repudiated Ilya Ehrenburg's call for
killing and raping, but the acts by then had been perpetrated.2 9 °
PROFESSOR CHEN: Ladies and gentlemen, our discussion this

afternoon has underscored the importance of giving balance and
emphasis to both national and international tribunals in securing a
system of accountability. It also spotlights the urgency of concerted

286

See id. at 425 (stating that "rape committed on an individual soldier's initiative has

frequently been prosecuted in national courts").
287 See, e.g., Theodor Meron, Shakespeare's Henry the Fifth and the Law of War, 86
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action now.
In paying tribute to Professor Telford Taylor today, it is
highly proper and fitting that we do all that we can to facilitate the
establishment of an international criminal court at the earliest possible
date so that world order based on the rule of law and human dignity
can be achieved.
I would like to thank our distinguished panelists for their
enlightening and inspiring remarks, and I would also like to thank our
audience members for their attention, patience, and participation.
Thank you all.

